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THE INTERNATIOANL CRIMINAL COURT:
A SOCIOLOGICAL HISTORY
Dawn Rothe, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 2004
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been touted as a new international
response to the worst atrocities of mankind: crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
crimes of aggression. Indeed, the implementation of a permanent international court is
a historical tum. However, the course to which an international criminal court
transpired dates back to the late 1800's. One hundred years of political, economic,
and social contradictions have aided and abated the process of what is now the
International Criminal Court. However, the dialectics between actors and institutions
has been neglected in historical and legal analysis. The purpose of this thesis is to take
a sociological perspective to understand the historical contexts, the social actors, and
the institutions involved in the development of the International Criminal Court.
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CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is hailed as the most
significant development in international law to date. The development of the Rome
Statute was a decade long process, eventually leading to official adoption in Rome on
July 17, 1998. A permanent International Criminal Court became a reality on July 1,
2002.
Nevertheless, the "Road to Rome" was a lengthy and contentious one (CICC 1 ,
2003). The effort to establish a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) is often
connected with the landmark decisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the
1949 Geneva Conventions. Indeed, these Conventions and Declarations played a
significant role in the development of an ICC. Yet the struggle to create a permanent
international system of justice has deeper historical roots.
The purpose of this thesis is to present a socio-historical analysis of the
attempts to establish an international criminal court. The analysis will show that the
creation of the ICC was a response to conflicts that occurred within international
society. This chapter presents a brief introduction to the development of an
International Criminal Court. A literature review, the theoretical framework, and a
section addressing the methodology that is used in this research will follow.
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The Coalition for an International Criminal Court is composed of governmental organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, legal commissions, academics, and private citizens aiding the
establishment of the ICC.
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The second chapter provides a detailed history of the development of an
International Criminal Court. This chapter is divided into specific historical periods:
1) 1872-1930; 2) 1931-1955; 3) 1974-1997 and; 4) 1998 development of the Rome
Statute. These divisions are made according to the time period when a major proposal
for an ICC was introduced and considered. Within this sociological history an effort is
made to identify the formal and informal actors/ social agents involved in each stage,
determine how and why the proposal for an ICC was made at that period, clarify the
ideological orientation of the political leadership, and identify the political
considerations that influenced the outcome of each attempt to establish the an ICC.
These issues speak to the social and political dimensions of the development of the
Court. They attempt to address the culturally embedded intentions of a group of actors
in a specific historical/political/ and sociological setting.
The third chapter presents an analysis of the process of establishing an ICC,
framed in the theoretical orientation of critical international law theory and
Chambliss' structural contradictions model of lawmaking. Due to the large number of
actors, conflicts, and political interests involved, the analysis limits the focus to two
key issues: jurisdiction and sovereignty. Jurisdiction and sovereignty are primary
issues throughout the historical attempts to establish an ICC and the development of
the Rome Statute. This chapter includes a section on the attempt of the US to
undermine the ICC by weakening its Articles and negotiating bilateral agreements
with other nation/states. An analysis of the potential of the ICC to be an effective tool
for international criminal justice is then offered. In conclusion, a brief summary of the
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history of the ICC will be provided along with the limitations of this study and the
potential for future research.

Historical Background
The founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Gustave
Moynier, was the first to formally propose an ICC in 1872 (Moynier, 1872). The
Franco-Prussian war resulted in mass atrocities committed by both sides, despite their
obligations under the first Geneva Convention of 18642• Moynier, distraught at the
violations of international treaties, proposed an ICC to try persons accused of war
crimes. The proposed international court never received any support from
international lawyers or state parties; it was left a one-man utopian desire (Harris,
1954; 1982).
The concept of an ICC was not revisited again until 1919. After WWI, the
framers of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles revived the endeavor to establish an ICC to
try the Kaiser and German war criminals (Cassese, 2003). Regretfully, the call for an
ICC was compromised: punishment for war crimes was to be handled by existing
National Military Tribunals. The failure of the proposed court resulted in trials held in
Lupzig, where 888 of the 901 persons accused of war crimes were acquitted, released,
or not tried. The thirteen convicted all escaped serving any of their sentences
(Bassiouni, 1973).
In 1937, the League of Nations attempted to establish an ICC. Two
International Conventions were concluded in Geneva on November 16: the
2

The Geneva Convention of 1864 was drafted to protect the wounded soldiers of battle. See UN Doc,
A/CN.4/7/Rev. 1, 1949.
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Prevention and Repression of Terrorism and the Creation of an International Criminal
Court (League of Nations Document Archived C.547.m.384. 1937). A Diplomatic
Conference was held for the proposed Charters that included 35 nation/state
delegates. The Charter for the creation of an ICC required the ratification of the
Prevention and Repression of Terrorism Treaty. However, neither convention
obtained sufficient numbers for ratification; subsequently an ICC failed to come into
existence (Bassiouni, 1975).
WWII consumed the energies of states, postponing any collective interest in an
ICC. However, as the war was coming to an end, attention refocused to a call for an
international institution to try individuals for the most heinous crimes of war. The general
concepts of international justice resonated throughout the world. Some had hopes that
with the end of the League of Nations and the development of the United Nations, the
world was a step closer to instituting a permanent criminal court (CICC, 2003). The
outcome however was not an ICC, but International Military Tribunals, instituted to
address the crimes against humanity. This period of history proved to be fruitful in the
development of customary and codified international law resulting in the Nuremberg
Principles. However, the hope of a permanent ICC was again discouraged. Indeed, efforts
to establish an ICC continued over the next several decades by institutional reformers and
civil society actors (Hampson, 2002). Still, it was not until 1989 when the "international
society"seriously reconsidered the establishment of an ICC.
The end of the Cold War brought increases in the number of UN peacekeeping
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operations. In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago approached the UN with a proposal for an ICC
as a device to address drug trafficking and terrorism (Sadat, 2002). An overwhelming
number of nation/states appeared ready for the concept of an ICC. The following nine
years proved to be challenging as the General Assembly of the UN, preparatory
committees, and nongovernmental agencies worked on a proposal for an ICC: The Rome
Statute. Finally, in 1998, member states overwhelmingly voted in favor of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (CICC, 2003).
On July 1, 2002 the International Criminal Court became a reality with more than
120 nation/states attending the convention of the Rome Statute. Currently, 139
nation/states have endorsed the Rome Statute and 90 states have become ratified
members of the ICC. A century long struggle to establish an international system of
justice has been achieved.
Beginning with the earliest efforts through the final development, attempts to
establish an ICC were fraught with, and hindered by, rivalries of competing political
ideologies, power differentials, cultural and economic interests, and differing social
systems. The basic tenet of "Shall the Court precede the Law, or the Law precede the
Court?" was yet another key impediment to an earlier development of an ICC (Report of
the 34th Conference, National Law Association, 1927). The development of international
law constitutes significant turning points in the historical process; nonetheless, the
historical journey to attain an international system of justice to implement the codified
laws has been a contentious process.
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This thesis is an attempt to illuminate the historical path of an International
Criminal Court. From the earliest to the final attempts to employ an ICC, the
underlying momentum was in response to conflicts (that had produced atrocities).
However, the responses to conflict are both ideological and political in nature. They
are social forces in a dynamic, dialectical process that is constrained but not
determined by each historical period (Chambliss, 1993). Each step of the journey
towards an ICC is built on existing political ideologies and institutions that are altered
and shaped by the human agency or actors (ibid).
The socio/historical analysis of the journey leading to the establishment of an
International Criminal Court is both, culturally and politically, significant today.
Understanding the historical nature of a phenomenon is important in many ways. To
evaluate changes made in the realm of international law, international relationships,
and the newly developed institution (ICC), it is necessary to understand the
circumstances within which these developments occurred. Often the lessons and
stories from the past are discarded as no longer relevant in today's society. However,
knowing the struggles and journey of the newly developed ICC, can bring insight to
the current structure and functions of the ICC, as well as the plausibility or
potentiality for this new international body to be legitimate and fruitful in its endeavor
to create an international codified set of standards for humanity based on justice
versus impunity.

7
Structure and Function of the ICC
The ICC consists of 4 Chambers: (1) the Presidency; (2) Judicial Court (An
Appeals Chamber, Trial Chamber, and a Pre-Trial Chamber); (3) Office of the
Prosecutor; and (4) the Registry. The Presidency is an elected office serving terms of
three years and holds responsibility for the administrative duties of the court,
excluding the office of the Prosecutor.3 The functions of the Judicial Court are
divided into Chambers, which allows the judges to be on more than one chamber if it
serves the functioning of the court in a more efficient manner. The Appellate
Chamber is exempt from this however, as an Appellate Judge is prohibited from
serving on other chambers (Article 39, Rome Statute).
The office of the Prosecutor is a separate division of the Court that has the
responsibility for the investigation of referrals on crimes covered by the ICC. The
Prosecutor has full authority over the administration of the Prosecutorial Division
(Article 42, Rome Statute). Cases brought to the ICC will be handled independently
by this office, unlike the system used by the United Nations' Security Council where
there must be joint agreement to charges brought forth against individuals for crimes
covered under international laws and treatises. A state may refer cases to the
Prosecution, or the Prosecutor can initiate the investigation based on information of a
crime being committed within the jurisdiction of the Court (Article 14 andl5 Rome
Statute). The Assembly of State Parties (ASP) will further define the relationship
agreement between the United Nations and the Court over disputes regarding how

3

For a complete and descriptive account of the structure of the ICC see Sadat, 2002; Cassesse, 2003.
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referrals will proceed and if the wording of the Rome Statute will allow an advisory
opinion from the International Court of Justice, especially regarding the Acts of
Aggression (Coalition for International Criminal Court- CICC 6,2002).
The Registry is solely responsible for the administrative and non-judicial
aspects of the Court and for creating a Victims and Witness Unit providing protective
and security measures for witnesses, victims or others at risk due to testimony given
to the court (Article 43 Rome Statute).
The intention of the ICC is to provide an international system of justice that
would address heinous crimes against humanity when a state is unable or unwilling to
investigate or prosecute any individual accused of the crimes specified in the Rome
Statute (Mullins, Kauzlarich, and Rothe 2002). Crimes that are subject for prosecution
under the Rome Statute are defined in Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8.
Article 5 of the Rome Statute lists the crimes within the jurisdiction of the
ICC: crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression still to be defined by the ASP (Article 5, paragraph 2, Rome Statute).
Crimes of genocide refer to "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group" (Article 6, Rome Statute). Article
7 defines crimes against humanity as acts that are widespread or a systematic attack
against a civilian population. This includes acts of torture, intentional causing of great
suffering to body or mental health, murder, and attacks directed against a civilian
population. Crimes against humanity are not as inclusive as previously recognized
Human Rights Law (HRL). The HRL applies in times of peace or war but is
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primarily conscious of protecting people against governmental violence against their
recognized civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights (Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res.217A (IIIO, UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948)). War
crimes are defined by breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 8/1949 (Article 8,
Rome Statute). These include torture or inhumane treatment, biological experiments,
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, and willfully denying a prisoner
of war or other protected person the right to a fair and regular trial.
The ICC is limited in its investigative reach, being unable to subpoena any
state or their records. While the Court may request a warrant or subpoena, the
Prosecutor and the Court lack an empowered policing agency to ensure the fulfillment
of either request (Article 54-58 Rome Statute). The Prosecutor is limited to
requesting the presence of persons being investigated, victims, and witnesses. The
Court must seek the cooperation of a state in fulfilling the Prosecutor's requests. It
must rely on the compliance of a state or state party to relinquish any evidence,
suspects, or witnesses that are relevant to the ongoing investigations carried out by the
Prosecutorial Branch. The Court is unable to enforce its decisions without voluntary
state compliance.
The Court has limited jurisdiction, inclusive only of a state party to the treaty
or by agreement of a state not a party to the Statute. The criteria listed in Article 12
for the exercise of jurisdiction requires a state to become a party to the statute or
accept the jurisdiction of the Court if the crime occurred on the State territory, its
vessel, or aircraft, or if the State of which a person accused is a national (Article 12,a-
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b). No person can be held liable by the court unless the crime occurred within the
jurisdiction of the court. Compliance by a non-party state is highly unlikely and non
compliance can act as a detriment to the ability of the ICC to be an effective measure
of international justice (Mullins, Kauzlarich, and Rothe, 2002). This has already
become an issue with the US at the forefront of an effort to challenge the validity and
powers of the Court.
Literature Review
Literature focused on international institutions, law, treatises, and the ICC
involves several different dimensions of information. This includes scholarly work by
international lawyers, traditional international law models, and contemporary models
of international law and international society. Therefore, this section is divided into
three parts. The first part examines research by international lawyers that provide
legalistic descriptive information on the establishment of an ICC. Part two focuses on
traditional international law models. The final part provides the theoretical frame that
is used in this thesis.
Descriptive Research
Much research on the development of international law, treatises, and charters
has been undertaken by legal scholars (see Bassiouni, 1969, 1971, 1972, 1973,1994,
1998, 1999; Cassesse, 2002; Falk, 1998; Ferencz, 1920, 1975, 1980; Harris, 1954;
Hudson, 1943; Minnow, 1998; Sadat, 2002 and; Shelton, 2000). Indeed, there is a
wealth of descriptive material on developments towards an ICC. However, the current
research lacks a theoretical and sociological focus.
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Benjamin Ferencz (1980) provides a collection of documents depicting the
search for an international system of justice that prohibits and attempts to codify acts
of aggression and offenses against peace. Ferencz traces the history of the
establishment of various international systems of justice: Hague Peace Conference,
International Court of Justice, International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg, and the
International Military Tribunals for the Far East. Ferencz presents numerous
international documents and a basic historical framework that can be utilized in an
analysis of the sociological, political, and historical factors at work in the process of
developing an ICC.
Judge Antonio Cassesse's (2002) anthology with commentary provides a
detailed description of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This
source provides an analysis of the process by which the Rome Statute was created
from 1994-1998, including a history of the drafting proposal by the Preparatory
Commission as well as extensive details on the structure and proceedings of the ICC.
Cassesse's work provides an in-depth documentation of events in the development of
the Rome Statute that is useful for defining the actors, conflicts, and resolutions for a
sociological analysis of the progress towards an ICC.
M. Cherif Bassiouni was an active participant in the development of the Rome
Statute and has actively supported an ICC for several decades. His most recent work
(2002) is an anthology which provides basic descriptive details of preceding laws,
commissions, and committees leading to the development of the ICC. Included in
Bassiouni's work are the main UN Conference Reports of 1994-1998. He (1975) has
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also written a volume titled International Terrorism and Political Crimes as presented
at the III International symposium in Syracuse, Sicily, 1973. This volume looks at the
issues of international law in matters of jurisdiction, legal attempts for control, and
methodological options for international legal control of terrorism (an ICC) which is
useful in analyzing the progress towards the development of an ICC and a standard set
of codified laws. Other works by Bassiouni (1973, 1997, 1998, 1999) complement
each other with updated descriptive accounts of the Rome Statute and international
criminal law.
Leila Sadat (2002) provides a synthesis of many of the major features of the
Rome Statute including the ICC contribution toward transforming international law.
She describes the preparatory work done by the Committee for the Establishment of
an ICC (1995) and the General Assembly's Committee for the Establishment of an
ICC (thru 1998). Sadat provides an excellent critique and analysis of the potentiality
of the ICC to be an effective tool of international justice based on the structure of
each Article within the Rome Statute through the lens of international law. Sadat's
work will be helpful in providing further descriptive information on the structure of
the ICC as it pertains to issues of jurisdiction.
Manley Hudson (1943) provides a detailed examination of the development of
a Permanent Court of Justice. His historical analysis includes looking at the steps to a
Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Prize Court. Hudson gives a detailed account
of the legal basis and structure for these courts including a brief historical context.
This is used to examine the conflicts of jurisdiction, which resulted in a non-criminal
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court. He concludes with an in depth presentation of documents relevant to the
International Court of Justice. Hudson's work will be utilized to attain information
necessary to analyze the outcome of a Permanent Court of Justice versus the proposed
Criminal Court.
Dinah Shelton (2000) is the editor of an anthology that provides explanatory
material on the ICC. This anthology explores the ICC potential to help implement
International Humanitarian Law, international peace, and human rights based on the
legal foundations of pertinent Articles within the ICC. This includes contributions by
authors examining the Tribunals that attempted to address atrocities against mankind,
women's issues in international criminal law within the development of the ICC, and
the new relationship between international law and Human Rights Law as it pertains
to the ICC.
The aforementioned authors have contributed greatly to the understanding of
the development of international law and the legal position of the ICC. However,
what is lacking in this literature is a socio-historical analysis of the development of a
permanent international criminal court. Specifically, what is deficient is a detailed
account of the actors (and their political ideology) involved in each stage, the
underlying conflicts between actors that resulted in the outcome of the proposed ICC,
and a theoretical framework that provides a guide for analysis.
Traditional Models of International Law
International law is embedded within a complex mix of conflicting traditions,
social practices, political, and economic ideologies within particular historical
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perspectives (Carty, 1991). Divergent theories have developed to explain the origin,
meaning, purpose, and context of international Jaw. This includes the positivist
orientation, the naturalist orientation, the liberal/modernism orientation, the liberal
orientation, the post-modernist orientation, and the critical law orientation.
Theoretical writing on international law has histo.ricaJly alternated between
positivist sovereignty centered theories and naturalist law theories. Natural law has
subsisted for 2,500 years in a variety of forms. This tradition dates back to the system
of Roman law, the Court of Chancery, and to philosophers such as Aquinas, Grotius,
Locke, and Hume (Friedmann, 1967). The philosophy of naturalism is founded on the
ideal that there exists an objective natural law (not man invented) based on norms of
conduct that are an essential part of human nature, thus, "existing in the reason and
conscience of every human being" (Brown, 1960:VI). Natural law philosophy began
to decline in the late 1800's due to the rise of nationalism, capitalism, relativism,
modem science, positivism (also known as utilitarianism and pragmatism), and the
rise of the Austinian jurisprudence (Brown, 1960).
The Austinian philosophy (John Austin 1790-1859) accepted Benthams'
model in the field of law and Kantian models (rejection of identifying law with
morals) (Friedamann, 1967; Koskeniemi, 2003). Austin founded the principle that
supreme power (state) limited by positive law is contradictory as the sovereign (state)
can impose positive law and morals on itself vis a vis treaties but the sovereign is not
under obligation to be limited by these self-imposed limitations. Thus, the sovereign
can abrogate these mutual agreements regardless of positive law. Austin then defines
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law as "a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intellectual
being having power over him" (Austin, 1867, in Friedmann, 1967:258). The
Austinian philosophy became a part of the growing trend of positivism. At times the
interjection between naturalism and positivism can be seen within the context of law
itself.For example, current traces of naturalism can be detected in concepts such as
human rights law, jus cogens or imperative norms, and rules valid in an erga omnes.
Each presumes relationships of a normative hierarchy that connect some form of
moral naturalism (Koskeniemi, 2003). However, they are combined within the
legalistic and positivistic frame of absolute consensus and obligation.
Positivism continues to be the dominant legal theory used even today within
domestic and international law.It has its foundations in the mid to late 1800's with
thinkers such as Austin, Dewey and modified later by Kelson and the Vienna School
(Friedmann, 1967)..Positivist international law is guided by the underlying
assumption that international law is representative of a general consensus among
nation/states (Carty, 1991). Laws are viewed as commands of human beings, not
connected to morals, and the "legal system is a closed logical system" (Friedmann,
1967: 256).
Liberalism has also been influential within international law. Perhaps the most
well-known and influential liberal theorists were Schumpter, Machiavelli, Kant, and
Montesquieu (Kegley, 1995).In general, the liberal/modernism paradigm assumes a
natural, pre-existing normative code with free and equal individuals that have ends
that differ and conflict. Social order can only be justified with reference to individual
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ends. According to the Kantian tradition, legal order must combine moral autonomy,
individualism, and political order. However, there exists great debate about what
constitutes liberalism. Zachar states, "There is no canonical description of
liberalism ...liberalism is multifaceted and what is or is not at its core can be
disputed" (Zachar, 1995 in Kegley, 1995: 108). Therefore, liberalism is often
intermingled with positivism or realism. The intermingling of these paradigmatic
themes in praxis is illustrated by Carty (1991) as he states,
"The UN Charter is to be seen as a positivising of the Kantian ideal, that states
recognize their security rests not on their own power or independent legal
existence, but upon a great league which is a united power and upon the
decision set by a law which expresses a united will (und von der Entscheidung
nach Gesetzen des vereinigten Willens). This is positivised in the sense that it
is not a mere idea but is actually recognized by states. Yet it is precisely this
distinction between idea and positive law which remains elusive in such
analysis and which it is a major part of the task of theorists of the 'liberal
tradition' to explore" (1991:21).
. The postmodern approach assumes difference, heterogeneity and conflict as
reality and this reality is subjective in nature for the actors within the social historical
context (Carty, 1991). From a postmodern perspective, international law is not a
system at all. Rather, it is better understood as a superstore, a warehouse of treaties,
customs, institutions, and norms. The value of postmodern international theory is
said to be the deconstruction of legal rhetoric, distinguishing the soft (normative laws)
from the hard (concrete laws). However, postmodern theory is relatively new to
international legal studies and takes on many forms, making it difficult to state any
particular perspective associated with this paradigm ·or specific utilization of
postmodernism and international legal research.
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Theoretical Frames Utilized

Critical international law theory follows the post-modem approach to
international law. It assumes the discipline of international law is governed by a
particular, historically conditioned discourse that is the translation onto the
international domain of some basic tenets of liberal political theory. The liberal law
theory assumes the absence of a central international legal order that state actors can
reference and it favors a "mature anarchy in international relations, the recognition of
states as independent centres of legal culture and significance, which have to be
understood, in relation to one another" (Carty, 1991 :66).
Critical international law theory is relatively new to the paradigms of
international law research. The limited usage of this model hinders the ability to show
previous substantive research. However, the concepts created by Carty for
international society and the views of international law in relation to international
society is a fitting theoretical frame to address the development of the ICC. Simply
stated, Critical International law theory provides the overarching system of
international relations to analyze existing conditions. According to Carty (1991)
Critical International Law Theory views international society as consisting of
opposing and self-differentiating national and nation/state traditions that are
intermingled with religious and economic systems, which can include transnational
characteristics. Simply stated, international society is composed of sovereign states
with divergent political interests, economic interests, cultural disparities, religions,
state practices and traditions. These divergent attributes are also contingent upon the
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historical and social milieu (Carty, 1991). Due to the diversity of interests, relations,
and state systems, relations of the international society are embedded with conflicts.
These conflicts are the result of a structural contradiction between an ideology of an
international society (perceived society composed of a fixed and united body with
similar values, ethos, and interests) and the composition of international relations
(composed of self-differentiating states' traditions).
The term "international society" implies an ideology of unity that exists at the
international relations level. A consensus of values and interests is implied within this
ideological and imagined society. Historically however, international relations and
international law was founded on principles and rules that guide the relations of states
with each other. Treaties and customary international laws were contracts between
states that were founded on consent and derived from state practices. International law
relied on national legal systems to govern themselves, international relations, and
customary practices. The differential values and interests of these states resulted in
conflicts such as WWI, WWII, Vietnam War, and other interstate disagreements.
However, historically international relations were viewed as independent relations
based on mutual interests. An overarching international ideology of one international
society did not exist. The earliest international documents through the mid 1980's
never addressed international governmental organizations or international relations
with a rhetoric of a "community". As international relations expanded to include
codified international law and expansions of states, an ideology of an international
society began to surface. This included the language used by the United Nations,
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Amnesty International, the International Red Cross, and other international
organizations promoting the ideology of unification or consensus among states. The
ideology of an international community thus served as an emerging value to coincide
with new principles. Yet, International society (composed of sovereign states with
differentiating traditions, political interests, economic interests, cultural disparities,
religions, and state practices), governed by a system of international law, contradicts
the existing make-up of international relations.
A critical theory of international law includes the system of international law
that incorporates the broader political system. The link between international law and
international politics is an inherently political and dialectic relationship (Scott, 1997).
This does not presume that international law is not a system in and of itself; however,
it is in a mutual interaction with the system of international society. The concepts
behind international law are founded on consent and mutual agreement between states
and by state practice within the international arena of relations; thus, international law
is mutually interacting within international society. Since law is man-made, political
in nature, and is the result of conflicts, further contradictions and conflicts within the
legal system occur.
In international law, contradictions exist between general principles that can
embody conflicting values. An example: contradictions between general principles of
law, "jus cogens4" which is "compelling law" and "erga omnes" which is "flowing to
all" can lead to laws of clarification or compulsion that will lead to further
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contradictions (Bassiouni, 1991; Danilenko, 1991). If a law is jus cogens it should
follow that it is erga omnes (Bassiouni, 1991). When something is compelling to and
for everyone, it would stand to reason that it should be expected for all. However, this
is not always the case. International Human Rights Laws are compelling but not
necessarily flowing to all. International law is based on a culmination of different
systems of justice that include civil law systems (based on common law) and
adversarial systems (such as the US legal system). It is also a culmination of
philosophical paradigms; naturalism and positivism. International law consists of
public international law (rights between states or the citizens of other states) and
private international law (controversies between private actors that have situations
having significant affect to more than one state) (Legal Information Institute, 2003).
The fundamental principles (customary laws) that guide international law then are
founded on willing state participation and acceptance. International law also has
contradictions within its own body of customary, charter, treaties, and codifications.
As international law is incorporated into the broader political system new conflicts
arise. These conflicts (in international law and international society) are addressed,
however, the fundamental structural contradiction within international society
remains, which is its composition of existing relations and an ideology representing a
unified system or society.
For the newly created ICC, the issue of jurisdiction is central to the structural
contradi.ction of international law (see appendix). Jurisdiction refers to the territory
4

For more information on the debate between jus cogens (implied as compelling and should therefore
be erga omnes) and the tautological nature of the two legal concepts see Bassiouni, 1999; Danilenko,
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over which authority to act is extended (Scott, at. Al 1985). It is a general principle
based on jus cogens but it is embodied with conflicting values (it is structured by
consent) resulting in an ideology of jus cogens but failing to attain erga omnes
(universal jurisdiction). Another example of the contradiction between jus cogens and
erga omnes (see previous example of HRL) is when political values and principles of
justice are used as general rules (customary) in international law which can be in
conflict or contradict specific rules of law that have not changed to correspond with
new general principles (Carty, 1991). With change or development in international
law, such as creating the ICC, new principles are adopted that reflect new values (e.g.
ideology of an international society based on common goals, interests, and
consensus). When these new principles lead to significant changes in the international
legal system as a whole (instituting a new international system of justice) the more
likely they will contradict extent rules such as existing international law based on
sovereign state authority and jurisdiction. This lends to conflict between development,
success, and legitimacy of the ICC (ibid).
The term international society is indeed, an imagined society, an ideology, to
promote a unity at the international level and is often associated with international
organizations representing civil actors as well as political institutions. This thesis uses
the term international society to represent a collection of state and civil actors, active
in the international political arena and in positions of power to impose or create
international institutions or international laws that affect the existing international

1991.

political realm in its historical contexts. This definition is based on the concept of
international society within the critical International Law model proposed by Carty.
International law is operationalized as a system composed of customary law, charters,
treaties, and resolutions, which is the format used by international legal scholars
(Bassiouni, Sadat, Cassesse, and Carty). International law is being viewed as
secondary and mutually interacting with international society. It is only from some
form of unity at the international level that customary law, charters, treaties, or
resolutions can occur: thus, the organization of international relations preceded
international law. This is not to imply that the chronological origin of international
society gives primacy over the system of international law. The two systems are
interconnected and dialectic. However, as critical international law theory illustrates,
this imagined society (united community) has contradictions based on the pre-existing
political, economic, judicial, and religious identifications of the representing actors
(states). Critical International Law Theory does not address how these contradictions
lead to the conflicts within international society or what affects these conflicts then
have. It is these structural contradictions that will be addressed using Chambliss'
(1993) model of structural contradictions to further expand the ability to analyze the
structural contradiction in terms of resulting conflicts or attempts to resolve the
contradiction.
The Critical International Law (CIL) theory provides the overarching system
that is essential to understand the more immediate or pragmatic issue of "making law"
and the development of a new international legal body by providing the structure
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where the essential structural contradiction exists. Therefore, it is necessary to
incorporate a theoretical model that addresses the structural contradictions themselves
and what is done to attempt to resolve these contradictions if any. The theoretical
model that is used in conjunction with CIL is Chambliss' (1993) Structural
Contradictions model. Together these theories provide the fundamental framework to
analyze international labors to establish a permanent International Criminal Court.
The Structural Contradictions model is situated within a Marxist tradition of
analyzing the state, law, and capitalism. Marx's original conception of these
institutions maintained that the core function of the state and law was to legitimate
and facilitate the economic structure (Lynch & Michalowski, 2000). Traditionally,
attempts to verify Marx's perspective relied on either the instrumentalist or
structuralist approach. The instrumentalist approach "holds that the state and law are
tools used by powerful groups to secure and promote their political and economic
concerns" (Lynch & Michalowski, 2000:44). The state, the ruling class, and law are
one. The economic, political, and social interests of the ruling class are expressed
within law that is created and used to the advantage of that class. The clearest
example of instrumental Marxism is the early work of Richard Quinney. For
structuralists, the state and law are expressions of the struggle between classes. This
perspective views include the powerful having the advantage but they cannot win
every conflict. Conflicts between social classes can also favor the non-ruling class.
The structuralist moved beyond the limited instrumentalist approach to view the state
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as a distinct factor of social organization. The state and law is an "outcome of the
contradiction of capitalism" (Lynch & Michalowski, 2000:48).
Within a Marxist framework, Bill Chambliss went beyond the instrumentalist
approach to examine the relations between the state structure and law. He views the
law as a means to temporarily resolve conflicts and dilemmas that are rooted in the
contradictions of capitalism. This moves from the conspiratorial view of the state as a
tool of the ruling class to an analysis of the state as multifunctional, serving the
interests of the ruling class and civil society in order to maintain itself (autonomy).
The contradictions of capitalism create conflicts between groups (classes). The polity
must contain or diffuse these conflicts. The process of containing one conflict can
then lead to a second conflict. The polity is then focused on the most critical of these
conflicts that would or could disrupt the social fabric. The legitimacy of the state and
economic structure is protected in this process by not ignoring large class conflicts.
The most often used resource to resolve these conflicts lies in the legal and legislative
branches: creation of new laws. The laws only address the immediacy of a conflict
and ignore the structural contradictions of the system itself. This results in a
temporary resolution but allows the cyclic pattern of conflicts to continue5•
Thus, Chambliss' basis contention is that law creation is a process aimed at
resolving conflicts and dilemmas that stem from underlying contradictions that are
historically specific and inherently set in a structure of a particular political,
economic, and social structure. Chambliss states, "Every society, nation, economic
5

Chambliss argues that even under extreme conditions of revolutionary means of replacing capitalism
with socialism, new contradictions would still arise (Chambliss, 19795).
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system, and historical period contains contradictory elements which are the moving
force behind social changes-including the creation of law" (Chambliss, 1979, Ed.
Chambliss and Katz, 1993: 9). Chambliss believes that through a methodology of
dialectic analysis, the context of these conflicts can best be understood. The dialectic
methodology "takes the interaction of people and institutions as the starting point for
an understanding of the social reactions" (Chambliss, 1993:8). It is also dialectic in the
sense that social or political agents are creating their own history from the resources
and constraints that they inherit from the past (ibid). This will allow an understanding
of the response to a conflict and the contradictions (political and legal ideologies) that
will affect the outcome for a proposed ICC. Although Chambliss' s model is directed
at analyzing law formation within the context of nation/states, it can be used under the
umbrella of an international society that is composed of a larger political and social
structure that contains a structural contradiction. By using the umbrella of a system of
international society and the system of international law (provided for in the critical
international law model) Chambliss' model fits well. Changes in the law do not
necessarily mean changes in international societal relations, just as changes in the
international societal views or relations do not always lead to changes in laws. These
then can also produce conflict or further contradictions. The response to conflicts is
not only political it is ideological (the promotion of an international system) and
structural (within the system of international law). The underlying contradictions of
an international society and system of international law remain unresolved. As the
aforementioned theoretical paradigm of critical international law theory illustrates,

these contradictions are embedded in the composition of international society
(independent states with differentiating traditions, cultures, religion, political and
economic interests) and international law (rules and principles which govern the
relations of states based on willing compliance). When conflicts occur, new laws, a
new international system of justice, or a new international ideology is created to
address these conflicts while ignoring the embedded contradictions.
Within the theoretical orientation of structural contradictions, the notion of
symbolic use of politics can be a relevant concept. These are political "symbolic"
gestures consciously designed to appease a conflicting force that was not ignorable
(Chambliss and Katz, 1993). They can also be symbolic in the sense that they are
conveying a cultural message even when not enforced in a legalistic sense (see jus
cogens and erga omnes). This is illustrated by legitimacy, which in its simplest form
implies conformity with law (as compelling or jus cogens). This is unlike legality,
which denotes accordance to specific laws. When political symbolic gestures are
conveyed as legitimate rules they do not necessarily imply that they are rules of law,
thus, escaping the compulsion of law while portraying legitimacy. The other side to
the symbolic use of politics is the alteration or adaptation of a proposed law that is
made malleable to existing legal proposals and erroneously consecrated as a
culmination of "shared interests". The final key component of Chambliss' model is
the importance of historical contingencies. These are, "the points at which laws are
produced (and or introduced6 ) that provide a new approach to an existing problem, a

6

This is my emphasis/inclusion.
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revision of the existing relationships between state, polity, and fundamental
institutions" (Chambliss and Siedman, 1928: 140).
Chambliss' model has been incorporated into many research projects
(Michalowski, 1993; Zatz and McDonald, 1993; Wonders and Frederic, 1993;
Calavita, 1993; Chambliss, 1993; and Grattet, 1993). These works expand upon
Chambliss' original model to "emphasize the importance of contradictory structural
and historical forces operating within and upon a given society" (Zatz, 1993:x) and
particular conflicts and dilemmas that have occurred. This thesis also expands
Chambliss' original model to the international level of analysis versus the structure of
capitalism within a state. It does so by emphasizing the contradiction within a
structural frame of relations (international society). This includes the historical forces
at work during conflicts that occurred due to the structural contradictions of
international society.
In summary, the theoretical framework used in this thesis includes critical
international law theory and the structural contradictions model. Critical international
law theory provides the most appropriate umbrella to situate within it the structural
contradictions model to address the social, historical, and political context of the
conflicts that arose from the laborious attempts by international actors to implement
an ICC. Utilizing Chambliss's structural contradictions model within the paradigm of
international society and international law illuminates the process used to resolve
conflicts: creating laws and/or an international system of justice. Thus, international
laws are created to resolve conflicts, however, the underlying contradictions of

international society are not addressed or resolved. The dialectic process illustrates
the relationship between international law and international society: laws meant to
resolve conflicts often result in creating new conflicts within international society. An
example of this can best be demonstrated by referring to the recent US war on Iraq.
International law was formed to address aggressive war over fifty years ago as a result
of WWI and WWII. The concept of enforcement for this international law however
was sidestepped due to the conflicts within international law (jus cogens or erga
omnes, issues of so·vereignty, and jurisdiction) and conflicts within the system of
internationaI society (differentiating traditions, political interests, ideologies,
economics, cultural and religious factors). The US's actions resulted in further
conflicts within international society as well as illuminating the contradictions of
international law. Within the system of international law, contradictions exist within
laws, as they are historically specific as well as endeavors to address conflicts of the
international society. This results in quagmires of interpretation and application of
international law, most significantly so for the establishment of future laws or
innovative forms of justice such as the ICC.

Methodology
The research design for this thesis is a qualitative, socio/historical case study.
By combining both, the sociological and historical approach to the case study of a
developing international criminal court, obstacles of conventional methods of
historical case studies and sociological case studies are prevented. Simply stated, a
sociological analysis does not attempt to explain or describe history and a historical
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case study can overlook the underlying process and meanings (sociological
perspectives) as they may play a minor role in the succession of events (Wieviorka,
1992). What this requires is a research design that can oscillate between historical
methods and sociological methods within a specific case study. Socio-historical
research can address processes over time, identify the interplay of meaningful actions
and structural contexts, and interpret the unintended and intended outcomes in social
transformations (Skocpol, 1984). The combined research methods help to eliminate
the risk of anachronism (analyzing events_ from a perspective that was unknown to the
social actors..and events that would not have been conceived in that particular
historical context) (Wieviorka, 1992).
The case study method incorporates a systematic gathering of information
about specific phenomena to allow for an effective understanding of how or why the
event (s) occurred. A case study method is not a style of data gathering or an
analytical technique: it is a methodological approach to research. This research design
utilized the spatiotemporal chronology strategy for organizing the archival data (Hill,
1993). This included separating and recording the archived records according to dates
of events that documented proposals for an ICC, conventions or meetings discussing
an ICC, historical events of that specific time era, associated actors, and changes or
resolutions that occurred in that specified chronological timeframe. As new data was
encountered it was also included in the spatiotemporal chronology. This, in effect,
allowed a research design that would incorporate both primary and secondary data for
analysis.
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This research is archival in nature. Each specific time period within this case
study consists of the development (or attempts) for an international criminal court.
This is done in light of historical studies. The case study includes several data sources
and a multi-faceted in-depth investigation into the social phenomenon of an ICC. The
case study is intrinsic in nature: meaning the case of a developing ICC is itself of
interest to the existing social order (Adler & Clark, 2003). The intrinsic nature of the
case study is not to test abstract theories, or to illustrate a general statement, but rather
to understand the intrinsic aspects of the process of establishing an ICC.
The data used in this research are broken down into historical timeframes
relevant to the development of an ICC. They are then used to provide a descriptive
analysis within a socio-historical context. An interpretation is then offered under the
paradigm of the aforementioned theoretical orientations.
Data Sources
The data sources used for this research include primary and secondary data.
The primary data consists of international documents. The strategy for obtaining the
data was based on topical searches and name-oriented searches (Hill, 1993). This
included searching for topical categories: international criminal court, Rome Statute,
League of Nations, and international documents. The name oriented search involved
0

I

searches from secondary source bibliographies to attain a triangulation for presented
facts (these sources will be expanded on in the following secondary source section)
The data that was found by utilizing this procedure includes the following documents;
United Nations resolutions, United Nations General Assembly sessions' reports,
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United Nations supplements, The League of Nations reports, International
Association of Penal Law reports, International Law Commission reports and
summaries, reports of the Task Force of the American Bar Association, Prepatory
Committee's minutes, the Preparatory Commission reports, and International Treaties.
The limitations of the data sources include availability as well as applicability for this
case study.
The bulk of this primary data was accessed from three sources: the United
Nations Library of Documents, the Yale Library of Law (Avalon Project) and the
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor Library Department of Documents.
This research also draws from secondary data, comprised of secondary
documents, other historical texts, international law books, European Journal of
International Law, and legal scholars (see lit. review) revolving around specific time
periods that formal proposals were made for an ICC. This data was obtained by
utilizing a topic search and a name-oriented search. The primary search led to
multiple sources of information that were analyzed for content, context, and
potentiality for triangulation. This included double referencing events surrounding the
development of an ICC by at least two authors or legal documentations. The
secondary data was used only when at least two sources substantiated the descriptive
information given.
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Conclusion
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a promising development for the
potential control of the· most heinous crimes against humanity. The ICC is the fruit of
a long and often embittered battle to establish an international system of criminal
justice. However, the process's that led to the Rome Statute are as significant as the
resultant ICC. Through the contradictions, conflicts, and resolutions that served as
historical constraints to establish such a court, insight can be gained into future
obstacles for the International Criminal Court and its ability to fulfill its stated
mission: international law based on justice not impunity. The purpose of this thesis is
to present a socio-historical analysis of the attempts to establish an international
criminal court, the Rome statute, and the final product, the ICC. By analyzing the
struggles and the journey to the newly developed ICC, sociologists and criminologists
can gain insight into the plausibility or potentiality for this new international body to
be legitimate and fruitful in its endeavor to create an international codified set of
standards for humanity based on justice versus impunity.
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CHAPTER II:
HISTORY OF DEVELOPING AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The history of proposals to establish an ICC to address conflicts within
international society spans 126 years. Throughout that frame of time, several major
conflicts occurred which resulted in different social relations and ideologies. The
following chapter is divided according to the historical eras surrounding attempts to
establish an ICC. The first section, 1872-1930 discusses the first formal attempt
through WWI. The following section covers 1931-1955. This era focuses on the
attempts to establish an ICC in response to WWI and as a result of WWII. From
1955-1974 the cold war era was the dominant factor in international relations and is
addressed in the third section. This is followed with a section discussing the events
from 1975-1997. This section is concluded with a brief summary of the historical
attempts to establish an ICC.
1872 to 1930-The Seeds for an International Criminal Court Were Planted
The first formal international attempts to establish a permanent international
criminal court date back tol872. Prior to this time, many states had entered into
bilateral and multilateral agreements based on violations of domestic laws (mainly
extradition requests) and treaties to regulate relations for preventing war (1648 Treaty
r
of Westphalia; Geneva Convention of 1864)
(Bassiouni, 1980). However, prosecution

and penalization of violations remained problematic. International state parties were
intent on keeping the concept of sanctions and penalties at the domestic level of
states.
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After the Franco-Prussian war, the first attempts to establish an ICC (in 1872)
by Moynier had proved futile. However, at the same time, the Peace Society in the
United States developed an international criminal code that outlined the jurisdiction
for an international criminal court (Hampson, 2002). Both attempts to establish an
ICC failed, as states did not support the notion of criminai sanctions at the
international level. International law had been established as a tool for defining inter
State relations. However, the growing concern over violations of the Laws and
Customs of War began to generate requests by independent international actors to
establish an institution for prosecution of individuals that committed heinous acts at
the international level.
In response to the changing nature of warfare, especially its increasing
mechanization and lethality, Emperor Alexander II of Russia convened a conference
in Brussels in 1874, which resulted in an International Declaration Concerning the
Laws and Customs of War. This remarkable document detailed rules for the
treatment of civilians and civilian territory (occupied and unoccupied), the wounded,
prisoners of war (combatants and spies), as well as the rules of surrender and
treatment of those who have capitulated.. Article VIII of the Declaration Concerning
Laws and Customs of War provided for prosecution of violators of the Laws and
Customs of War at the international level (Ferencz, 1980). The International Law
Association submitted a report on the feasibility of such an International code of laws
(2nd Report, Geneva ILA, 1874). State actors perceived the idea of international
culpability with skepticism; International Law's purview was limited to inter-State
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relationships. The Declaration of 1874 never received enough support to be adopted.
Just a few years later, General Ulysees Grant of the United States wrote to the
Universal Peace Union requesting that an international court be established that "shall
be recognized by all nations, which will take into consideration all differences
between nations" (Grant, in Ferencz, 1980: 6). Just as previous proposals for
international criminal liability were met with resistance, the suggestion by Grant
failed to materialize.
In 1895, the International Red Cross again attempted to establish support for
an ICC in Geneva. However, the Institute of International Law rejected the formal
proposal made at Geneva due to the proposal's failure to contain any specificity for
violations or the violators of the Rules of War (Ferencz, 1980). Nations continued to
expand their military powers hoping to provide security against competing nations.
However, the costs of not establishing an international criminal system of laws or
justice led to calls for an international solution to the growing threats to sovereign
nations by other sovereign nations. This brought about the first major treaty defining
(though excluding punitive measures) international law: The Hague Conventions of
1899.
The Hague Conventions of 1899 establish non-binding mediation and
arbitration as the key mechanisms of inter-state conflict resolution (Article 1-19).
However, the agreement also calls for the establishment of a permanent Court of
Arbitration (Article 20) that "shall be competent for all arbitration cases, unless the
parties agree to institute a special Tribunal" (Article 21). Even though the agreement
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was clear on the non-binding nature of the processes and nations had the right to
select the judges to act as arbitrators, many nations in attendance adopted the
principles under reservation. For example, the United States, in a sense establishing a
future pattern, expressed general support for the Court and its processes, but declared
that it would neither be compelled to intervene in any the affairs of any foreign nation
nor relinquish sovereignty for domestic issues (Ferencz, 1980)
At this time the Law of Nations and International Law were viewed as
conventional terms (Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of
Nations, 1882). They were viewed in the form of inter-State relations and within an
international society of independent sovereign states. Chancellor Kent states:
"That collection of customary, conventional, and judicial, which independent
States appeal to for the purpose of determining their rights, prescribing their
duties and regulating their intercourse, in peace and war, imposed by opinion
and based on the consent of nations" (Kent, 1882: 169).
The limited Treaties include the Maritime Law in Declaration of Paris (adopted by
forty six States), which was seen as a uniform code of International law but with the
hopes of it becoming a "permanence and fixity of principle to the Law of Nations"
(Kent, 1882: 171)7.
During the Second Hague Conference of 1907, United States' representative
and Jurists, Joseph Choate and James Scott, brought forth a request to establish a
permanent judicial court that would exclude national interests and be based on
international law (Scott, 1908: UN Doc: P 35, 1920). Even though the US had made
this proposal, it had done so with a set of exclusions based on its own national
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interests, which included issues that involved vital interests and sovereignty. The
proposal by the US Jurists, Project of a Permanent Court oflnternational Justice and
Resolution, was to be a non-criminal and non-universal court. In response to the US
proposal, Jurist Mill stated: "Penal law is the essence of law: whereas the essence of
Arbitration is compromise" (Utilaianism, Chapter IV, 24th Conf. ILA, 1907). The US
proposal never attained any support and no other provisions for a criminal court were
officially proposed (24th Conf. ILA, 1907). Nations still refused to be controlled or
bound by decisions of a court that they could not direct.
The 1907 Hague Conventions resulted in the furtherance of international law
and customs as they related to military affairs. It restated the 1899 agreements,
expanding and refining them. However, no provisions were made for a permanent
ICC or enforcement mechanisms. Nations were for prosecution of treaty violations,
including their own citizens or captured belligerents from other nations. Issues of
sovereignty, international law and the dominance of domestic law versus an
overarching body of international law remained the custom for state practices. The
concern for an international criminal court did not surface again until a retrospective
evaluation of international events following WWI.
Nations soon found themselves in a decade of international battles and wars.
In 1914 the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated at Sarajevo
(Ferencz, 1980). Europe was full of conflicting ethnic and national groups. Austria
declared war on Serbia. Germany declared war on Russia and France intruded into
7

It should be noted that the US did not become a signatory to this or participate in the process of the
Maritime Paris Peace Treaty because of issues of sovereignty.
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Belgium. England reacted to its commitment to protect Belgium borders and joined
the conflicts. Other allies soon joined the three major powers (Russia, Germany, and
France), which included Turkey, Bulgaria, Japan, Italy, Romania, Greece, and the
United States (Ferencz, 1980). By 1914, twenty-three out of forty-eight nations were
at war (Ferencz, 1980). Prior treaties and conventions were put to the wayside as the
,
war progressed; the 'rules' of war were apparently
deemed superfluous and flagrantly

violated. November of 1918, the end of WWI, brought a time of devastation, death
tolls, nation rebuilding, and a yearning for peace. Yet, this epoch of history brought a
new chapter..for the development of criminal responsibility of war crimes (Bassiouni,
1973). The interest in an ICC was embraced by some nations and once again put on
the international forum for discussion.
The Paris Peace Conference convened in Versailles in January 1919. The
victors of WWI first sought a peace treaty with the defeated Germany and established
two Commissions (UN Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev.lUN No. 1949. V. 8). One Commission
was to report on the plausibility for a League of Nations and the other Commission
was to report all violations of international law (limited to the defeated states)
(Bassiouni, 1973; Ferencz, 1980). The Treaty of Versailles would become a historical
frame for future international law violations.
The League of Nations was established in April of 1919. The atrocities and
devastation of WWI prompted M. Leon Bourgeois of France to propose to the League
of Nations the establishment of an ICC with an international Army to enforce the
decisions of the court. The US delegates refused consent to create an ICC without a
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precedence of international law and unknown to state practices (e.g. criminal
prosecution of state leaders and expanding jurisdiction of international law beyond
inter-State relations). The US favored national military tribunals that followed
national court precedents or the Court of International Justice and Arbitration. The
Netherlands favored a Permanent Court of International Justice (UN Doc, P: 35,
Article 1,14: 1920). The proposed ICC by France failed to gain enough support and
had overwhelming opposition. Thus, an International High Tribunal consisting of
twenty-two members was formed to address the violations of international law that
had been committed by Germany and its Allies. However, this era too was plagued by
conflicts between national interests, sovereignty, and international law (especially the
US and Japan, which opposed with reservations on what should constitute
international law, limitations to jurisdiction, and what was to be considered violations
of the Rules of War). In spite of US objections, the Commission on Responsibility of
the Authors of War and Enforcement of Penalties proposed a special tribunal for the
Emperor of Germany, for the "supreme offense against international morality and the
sanctity of treaties" (Treaty of Peace, 1919: Article 227). The US opposed concepts of
criminal liability imposed for war acts that included state leaders and the waging of
unlawful war; however, the tribunal was still created but failed to be utilized as the
Netherlands refused to extradite war criminals. The Germans had begun to embark on
diplomatic efforts to prevent the extradition of listed war criminals (Bassiouni and
Nando, 1973). The Japanese did not concede that international law was founded on
penal law and would have serious "consequences that would be created in the history
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of international law by the prosecution for breaches of the laws and customs of war of
enemy heads of states" (1973: 567). The internal conflicts that arose from the non
used military tribunals and the lack of prosecution continued to illustrate the
contradictions between international law and nations. These conflicts would continue
to be the center of debate with the upcoming Jurists Committee's proposal.
Under Article 14 of the newly drafted Charter for the League of Nations, a
permanent international court was to be created. In 1920, a Committee of Jurists was
appointed to undertake the duty of attempting to fulfill Article 14 (Process-Verbaux
of Proceedin.gs of Committee, The Hague 1920). The Advisory Committee submitted
a Resolution to establish a high court of international justice to try crimes in breach of
international public order or against the universal law of nations (Hudson, 1938). The
concepts of international public order and a universal law of nations became highly
debated and received little support from the parties to the League of Nations or the US
(Minutes of the Council, 10th session 1920).
Baron Descamps of Belgium, Chair of the Committee of Jurists had remained
in full support of creating an ICC. The notion of a court as a permanent international
entity versus an ex post facto creation seemed to be the solution to the previous
failings of the prosecution of German high officials. The Norwegian Jurist was
adamantly opposed to an ICC and suggested the proposal fell out of the Committee's
authority. Japan's member reiterated this objection. Holland's member, Mr. Loder,
wanted an agreed upon definition of international crimes before consenting to such a
proposal. Member after member viewed the attempt to establish an ICC without the
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definition and codification of international law as violating nullem crimen sine lege

8

.

Thus, an ICC was perceived as premature (Ferencz, 1980). Elihu Root, from the US,
had participated in attempts to establish an ICC several years earlier. However, just as
his previous proposals had reservations founded on the US concerns of its sovereignty
and national interests, Root's participation in the Committee of Jurists was a
diplomatic maneuver. Root's recommendation was to implement a High Court of
Justice as a part of the League of Nations (Proces-Verbaux, 1920 The Hague). The
First Assembly of the League of Nations accepted the outcome of the Committee of
Jurists: an ICC was premature and the concept was again put on the shelf. As the
world had entered a momentary phase of peace, public and political pressure for an
ICC temporarily subsided.
While the concept of an ICC was met with little enthusiasm by many nations,
the International Law Association (ILA founded in 1873) continued to promote the
concept along with many scholars (ILA Report of 1873). In September 1924, the
League of Nations resolved to create a special committee for codification of
international law in attempt to halt many of the previous arguments against an ICC
(Fifth Assembly Resolution, 1926). In Vienna, 1926, the ILA again met with
Committee members appointed by the Executive Council of the League to discuss the
matter of an ICC. The conclusion drawn was that a court was "not only expedient but
also practicable" (International Law Report, 1926: 34: 109). In 1926 the ILA
approved a plan for an ICC and proposed codification of international law. A draft by

8

There can be no crime without a preceding law
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Hugh Bellot, was used and modified as a premise for an ICC. Bellot had established
himself as the leading proponent for an ICC; however, his efforts were not fulfilled
within his life as he died at a Conference in Warsaw in 1928 (Ferencz, 1980). The
Association recommended that the proposed court also be a penal court and be
situated at the Hague; however, the concept of states being culpable for offenses
outside of their territory was still at the center of controversy over issues of
sovereignty and a court's jurisdiction remained unresolved (International Law Report,
1926; 34: 106). The leading nations were not ready to comply with a court that
demanded compulsory jurisdiction.
The underlying contradiction of an international system (an ideology of an
international society) versus sovereign nations (existing international relations)
remained a fixture of conflict for the next several decades. As an ICC failed to
materialize, nations relied on conferences, treaties of non-aggression, conventions,
and potential codification meetings as a medium for addressing international relations
(e.g. Paris Pact of 1928; Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928; Resolution of the Sixth Pan
American Conference, 1928; Convention on the definition of Aggressor, London
1933; Anti War Treaty of Non-aggression and Conciliation, Rio de Janeiro 1933;
Geneva Conventions of 1925 and; International Conventions on Amelioration of the
Wounded, Geneva 1929) (Bassiouni, 1973). These reinforced the common practice of
international law as an inter-State tool versus a system of universality; essentially
international law was operating as a system of diplomatic agreements, not a binding
regulatory institution. Negotiations or discussions for an ICC would not arise again
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until the next major international conflict occurred. However, the very existence of
these accords served the purpose of continuing to build a framework for and a body of
international law-the very existence of which enhanced the legitimacy of the ICC
notion itself.
In summary, these initial attempts to create an ICC met with resistance. States
held to the ideology of sovereignty and international law as a tool for inter-State
relations all the while forming an alliance of an international society (League of
Nations and International Law Association). As conflicts arose, international
organization·s, charters, and treaties were formed to try to resolve these. As will be
discussed later, these issues are one of the primary conflicts and compromises of the
ICC jurisdictional powers (a complimentary system of justice).
After WWI, the League of Nations was formed to attempt to resolve the
earlier conflicts of enforcing violations of inter-State relation treaties in the form of a
system of universal international law. The unsuccessful outcome for an ICC and the
end result of a non-materialized IMT was an example of how a conflict (between an
ideology and need for universal international law) and the political cooperation of the
international society (composed of different sovereign states) created further conflicts
and resulted in new international laws proposed within a system of international
justice. The ability for the Netherlands to refuse to extradite, thus harboring the
German criminals, and Germany's diplomatic maneuvers to use international law as
complimentary to and within their domestic legal system were the result of these
contradictions not being resolved. The establishment of a permanent ICC was
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unacceptable in the form of universality and the contradictions of international society
and the growing body of international law remained. Laws continued to become jus
cogens but the concept of erga omnes remained unfulfilled as law was still seen as
inter-State, thus not flowing to all.
1931 to 1955- Global Crisis and the Birth. of the United Nations
An economic crisis engulfed the world beginning in 1929; nations
concentrated on their own affairs, ignoring existing concerns about an international
court or the codification of international law. Nations focused on reducing
expenditures in the form of limiting their military armaments. The Worldwide
Disarmament Conference, convened in 1932, focused on economics and disarmament
allowed some nations to briefly consider that the era might be ripe for the
empowerment of the League of Nations. While this was met with less enthusiasm
than previous attempts by some states, other states considered the empowerment of
the League necessary due to the perceived vulnerability of nations at this time
(Ferencz, 1980). Germany, a large source of opposition, walked out of the conference
and abstained its membership in the League of Nations. The notions of disarmament
and a permanent ICC were further limited by the existing major powers. Most were
unwilling to define aggression or subjugate themselves to international constraints of
their power. Rather, nations turned back to rebuilding their armaments, ending the
brief period that was focused on reducing expenditures or attaining disarmament;
violence again took center stage in 1934.
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On October 9 \ 1934, King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the Foreign Minister
of France were assassinated while the King was on a visit to France (Ferencz, 1980).
The Romanian Minister Duca and the Austrian Chancellor Dolfuss were assassinated.
Just as the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo sparked international
war, these unfortunate acts of terrorism (assassination) contributed to political
destabilization; however, they sparked a renewed interest in establishing international
justice. The French Government sent word to the League of Nations calling for a
convention to elaborate on the repression of crimes (Bassiouni, 1975).
In December 1934, France submitted a memorandum supporting the
condemnation of terrorism and for the establishment of an international penal court.
The League responded and formulated a committee of eleven members to begin work
on a draft that was proposed for the repression of terrorist acts. The eleven members
represented Belgium, the United Kingdom, Chile, Spain, France, Hungary, Italy,
Poland, Switzerland, and the USSR. This committee was referred to as the Terrorism
Committee (Ferencz, 1980). The Commission proposed a resolution that defined
terrorists' acts and proposed punishment by an ICC. The first draft contained Articles
7, 8, and 9 which proposed an ICC (Committee for the International Repression of
Terrorism, 1935). The second part of the draft included the structure and function of
said court. Romania was one of the leading proponents of the Draft. The US
diplomatically suggested the concept was a noble effort however; they had no need to
consider or participate in this Draft (ibid). Guatemala gave its complete support for
France's proposal and the subsequent 1935 Draft. Other nations included their own
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suggestions or technical changes suited to their nations interests and current judicial
system.
The second session of the Committee on Terrorism met in 1936 to discuss
observations, objections, and support of the proposed treaty. Egypt supported an ICC
and the concept of compulsory jurisdiction of the court. The Netherlands refuted the
jurisdiction, as its nations practice was to grant "hospitality to political refugees"
(ibid). The Dutch contingently accepted the draft of jurisdiction but wanted
clarification of "foreseen" problems. The Committee considered these responses and
revised their~original draft (Committee for the International Repression of Terrorism,
1936). Part of this revision was the separation of the Terrorism Treaty into two
separate Treaties: (1) the Repression of Terrorism Convention and (2) a treaty for an
ICC. This allowed any states that objected to an ICC to adopt the Terrorism
Convention however; no state could adopt the ICC Treaty without adopting the
Terrorism Prevention Treaty. Bolivia supported the final Drafts that were completed
in 1936. However, Australia, Hungary, Norway, Venezuela, and Poland opposed the
establishment of a permanent ICC (Ferencz, 1980). British India had problems with
the geographic location of the court since it would be inaccessible for their
representatives and domestic issues of coinciding legislation. Austria would only
consider jurisdiction of said court if the laws broken fell under Austrian domestic law.
The USSR believed the Draft should have been limited to terrorist acts that
endangered the world as a whole. The United Kingdom wanted to abandon the idea of
an ICC as premature and unnecessary at that time (Committee for the International

Repression of Terrorism, 1936). The eleven-member committee met again for its final
session to modify their draft in response to the nations' comments. The concept or
mention of an ICC was vacated from the Terrorism Treaty: two separate treaties had
been officially formed (Creation of an ICC and Repression of Terrorism).
In May of 1937, the Council convened a conference on the Repression of
Terrorism. Thirty-six nations attended. The Final Act of the international conference
was signed November 1937 (League of Nations Proceedings of the International
Conference on the Repression of Terrorism, 1937). By May 1938, thirteen states had
signed the Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court: Belgium,
Bulgaria, Cuba, Spain, France, Greece, Monaco, Netherlands, Romania, and
Czechoslovakia. However, no state ratified this Convention leaving it another
unfulfilled attempt to establish an ICC (only one state ratified the Terrorism
Convention: British/India) (League of Nations Proceedings of the International
Conference on the Repression of Terrorism, 1937).
The underlying obstacles of the contradiction between an "international
society", sovereignty, and inter-state relations versus intra-state relations mediated by
an ICC were still viewed as impermeable. Simply stated, states were unwilling to
have any domestic interference by way of international jurisdiction. Nation-states
would not submit themselves to the compulsory authority of another organization.
The conflicts between different forms of judicial systems of states created yet another
impasse for the potentiality of an ICC to be established. These conflicts, coupled with
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the escalating violence and emergence of wars, again, tabled the establishment of an
ICC.
During the 1930's the Spanish Civil War broke out, Italy invaded Abbyssinia
(Ethiopia), and Germany had begun its aggressive and militaristic policies by 1938
(Bassiouni, 1999). The Rhineland had again come under German occupation. German
troops invaded Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Again, Britain and France
declared war on Germany. The Soviet Union moved into the Eastern part of Poland.
Russia invaded Finland. Finland in tum called upon the League of Nations for help
(Ferencz, 1980). The Minister of France, Paul-Boncour, who had staunchly supported
an ICC, believed the events in the world were a "tardy awakening of public
conscience" (League of Nations Record, in Ferencz, 1980: 55). Ironically, the League
of Nations that had been called upon for support was in the midst of disintegrating as
its members were involved in mass world conflicts. By 1940, Germany invaded
Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France. By 1941,
Germany had invaded Greece, Yugoslavia, and finally the Soviet Union. The Hitler
regime had already begun its mission of genocide. Japan attacked the US. Germany
(bound with Japan) declared war on the US. Nearly the entire world was involved in a
WWII. Hindsight was becoming a vision of lost opportunity.
The response to a major conflict once again brought together another body to
promote an ICC. While the war was occurring, state delegates met in London
(Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg)
proclaiming a need for international prosecution for the atrocities being committed
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that were in blatant violation of international treaties, charters, and customary law. In
January of 1942, twenty-six nations that were.at war with Germany and Japan signed
a Declaration in Washington stating their allegiances and cooperation to not make
peace with any of the German Axis (Italy, Japan, and Germany) (Ferencz, 1980). The
title of thjs meeting was the Declaration by United Nations. In Moscow, 1943, the
United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and the United States proclaimed to be the voices of•
thirty-three United Nations warning Germany that prosecution at the international
level was imminent (Bassiouni, 1973).
During the world crisis, an unofficial group called, the London International
Assembly (operating under the old auspices of the League of Nations), convened to
discuss the punishment of war crimes and creation of an apparatus to do so (Ferencz,
1980). The members consisted of designated delegates in exile such as Dr. Benes of
Czechoslovakja, Rene Cassin of France, and Dr. Marcel of Belgium. They began
workjng on a proposal for codification of international law, as this was one of the
major stumbling blocks to previous attempts to establish an ICC (UNWCC, 1942). In
June 1943, the London International Assembly prepared a final convention proposing
an ICC be created by the newly emerging United Nations to be empowered by an
International Constabulary (Historical Survey of the Question of International
Crimjnal Jurisdiction, UN 1949). Much of their work was incorporated into the future
war crime trials of German's mjlitary however, their proposals for an ICC did not
proceed much further than the past attempts, except perhaps, to remjnd the
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"international society" that the contradictions within "international society" and
international law must be resolved, vis a vis a compulsory ICC.
Past attempts to resolve these conflicts had only successfully been addressed
by settling conflicts temporaricy via conventions, multilateral agreements, and treaties
until the next major conflict occurred. The resolve to try German war criminals by an
International Military Tribunal versus a permanent ICC was another reminder of the
inability or unwillingness of state leaders to commit themselves to a higher legal
authority as well as their unwillingness to submit their own ideology of sovereign
nations to a system of universal international law.
The impetus for an International Military Tribunal (IMT) served three key
functions: (1) bringing vindication for the atrocities of the Nazis, (2) establishing a
thorough historical record of Nazi atrocities, and (3) to generate deterrence against
future genocides and war crimes (Ferencz, 1980). Yet, even an ex post facto ad hoc
form of international justice was ridden with conflicts over the technicalities of
procedure and precedence of international law. Conflicts emerged over the
contradictions of divergent national systems in this newly arranged international
society. The drafting of the IMT Charter proved a difficult task. The contrasts
between civil law, adversarial common law, and "Socialist Justice" brought about a
mixture of processes. The problematical outcomes that arise from divergent systems
of justice will again resurface in conflicts during the establishment of the Rome
statute and the ICC. Once the procedural and legal issues were resolved, the charter of
the IMT was appended to the London Agreement in August 1945.
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At nearly the same time in 1945, representatives of fifty states assembled in
San Francisco, US to agree on a charter for an international organization to maintain
peace and security called the United Nations. This included the role of the Security
Council in the UN and an bitter debate over an ICC (United Nations Conference on
International Organization, 1945). The US and the Soviet Union led the opposition for
an independent judicial organ with compulsory jurisdiction. Just as the US Senate had
doused the US membership in the League of Nations, it also squashed the jurisdiction
of the Court of Justice unless it was in the US interests (Ferencz, 1980). The result of
this Conference led to the Ad hoc and International Court of Justice with limited
powers.
At the end of the Nuremberg trials, Octoberl, 1946, a long effort to create an
ICC began. The United Nations now replaced the League of Nations. The UN
appointed the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to report on the advisability
of bringing under the UN all activities previously carried on by the League of Nations
and activities carried on by the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission
(ESC Res 7(1)). The UN Charter continued a precedent formulated by the League to
develop international Jaw and its codification. The first steps to codify international
law and to establish a permanent ICC had begun. The stated vision was for a
permanent, competent and empowered ICC to adjudicate war crimes and crimes
against peace. Designed to remove the longstanding argument of ex post facto, it was
hoped a codified standard of international law would be developed (Harris, 1999).
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The International Congress (IC) (composed of international lawyers from
twenty-two states and the prosecuting powers of the IMT) convened in Paris to call
for an ICC. Leading the initiation for an ICC was Judge Henri Donnediu de Vabres,
the French Judge on the IMT. He made two proposals. One was for a permanent ICC
and the other was to establish a criminal chamber within the existing Court of Justice.
The Dutch representative fully supported the French proposal for an ICC. However,
Russia, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Egypt believed that an attempt to establish an ICC
was out of the jurisdiction of the Committee's mandate and that it would be contrary
to Article 7 of the UN Charter (the Court of Justice without mandatory jurisdiction is
mentioned) (Ferencz, 1980). However, Article 7 states, "such subsidiary organs as
may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter."
Since the US had reservations about the court, the US representative suggested the
matter be transferred to a commission of experts.
In the wake of the holocaust, the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC)
was also working on a mandate to study and formalize a convention dealing with
Genocide. The Secretary General consulted with members of the International Penal
Law Association and other international law experts (Ferencz, 1980). A first draft
included the proposal for an ICC. The proposal provided for two types of courts: a
permanent ICC or an ad hoc Tribunal to address crimes of genocide. This was
submitted to states to choose the most acceptable form of court according to their
interests and willingness to support (UN Doc A/332 and A/336 1947). State responses
were both favorable and unfavorable to a permanent ICC. Many included their own
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interests and suggestions to the proposal. Haiti favored the proposal but suggested the
Court of Justice at The Hague be given mandatory jurisdiction over international
crimes. Venezuela adamantly opposed any form of compulsory jurisdiction or
extradition requirements. The US supported an International Court in the form of ad
hoc Tribunals and recommended the matter be given to the International Law
Association (ILA) for deliberation (Ferencz, 1980). France was in full support of a
permanent ICC that would have mandatory jurisdiction. Other states including the
USSR, Egypt, Brazil, and the United Kingdom failed to respond, as they believed the
subject of an ICC required further study.
In the interim, the United Nations General Assembly considered the proposals
made by the IC and the ECOSOC including transferring the proposal for an ICC to
the ILA, when they convened for the drafting of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide (Harris, 1999). The Resolution on the prevention and
punishment of the crime of genocide was coupled with another resolution by the US,
Netherlands, and several other states that had been active in the aforementioned draft
of genocide. The, second resolution requested an International Law Commission study
the desirability for a criminal chamber of the Court of Justice.
In December 1948, the General Assembly passed the proposal on and
requested the International Law Commission (ILC) consider the possibility of creating
a permanent ICC and/or creating a chamber within the Court of Justice, while they
were formulating the principles of international law (Ferencz, 1980).
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The efforts advanced by some international organizations to create an ICC as a
part of the Genocide Convention ended in 1948. However, the hope for an ICC did
not completely whither as the ILC would continue the battle to establish an ICC. The
UN appeared to be fully committed to an international society, international law, and
an ICC. This is traced with the attempts of codification of international crimes and
with the draft statute for an ICC (Bassiouni, 1999). The UN Charter also
institutionalized social representation and allowed NGO's a consultative role
(Hampson, 2002). This historic change to integrating civil society in a formal
internationaT institution would play a significant role in the future development of an
ICC.
The International Law Commission (composed of fifteen members) convened
their first annual session in April 1949 to tackle the responsibility the General
Assembly had passed on to it (Ferencz, 1980). This included the formulation of the
principles of international law, a code of offenses against peace and security, a code
of international crimes, and a judicial organ. At the same time the Rapporteurs of the
ILC were working on their agenda, several Conventions were signed in Geneva that
would aid the ILC in attempts to carry out its mission: most significant was the
acknowledgement of a foreign court having jurisdiction over war criminals of another
state. This proposal cut right into the issue of state sovereignty. If a useful and
independent ICC was to be established, states must transfer some of their autonomy to
the body. A court, which cannot act on its own, which nations did not submit to
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would have little ability to control or punish the actions of criminal individuals and
organizations.
The ILC formed subcommittees to tackle the demands of the UN General
Assembly. A special Rapporteur was appointed to prepare a draft Code of Offences
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind and another Rapporteur was assigned to
formulate a draft for an ICC (Bassiouni, 1999; UN Doc NCN.4/15 (1950). The first
report submitted to the ILC was a report on an ICC. This report condemned the
separation of formulating a substantive criminal code and a statute for an ICC, as they
were complfmentary. A second-Rapporteur was then appointed to develop·a draft for
an ICC. The two Rapporteurs were Jean Spiropoulos and Emil Sandstrom. They had
separate agendas and ideologies, which not only conflicted but reflected two trends
within the world: idealism and political realism (Bassiouni, 1999). The issues of
national sovereignty, classical Jaw of nations, and a general mistrust of any
international constraints fueled conflicts for an ICC. The Soviet Union feared for its
sovereignty upon the establishment of such a court, the US would not accept a court
at the height of the cold war, France supported the concept of an ICC but did not
attempt to use political weight to ensure its position, and the United Kingdom
regarded the matter as politically premature (Bassiouni, 1999). These positions were
not new in the bitter battle to establish an empowered ICC. One of the defining
features of the classic nation-state is its right to self-regulate; making its own laws,
establishing its own courts, determining its own foreign, economic and domestic
policy agendas are all seen as the sole purview of a state itself. The existence of an
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external legal body by its very nature limits a state's liberty to pursue its interests in
its own fashion.
The General Assembly formed another Special Committee in 1950 that was
composed of seventeen states to draft a convention to establish an ICC. This
Committee completed its first draft in 1951 that modeled the International Court of
Justice (UN Doc A/2136, A/2186, A/2186/Add 1, November 1952). The Committee
agreed, "the court should be a permanent body but should only function in case of
need, and that it would be concerned with individuals, not bodies corporate" (UN Doc
A/2136, A/2186, A/2186/Add 1, November 1952). The court should be conceived
through a Convention but remain linked with the United Nations. There remained
many objections to the clarifications of the role of the court. For example, the US
wanted the court open only for signatory states and France wanted the court to address
international crimes and lesser crimes involving states and crimes of international
concern. Despite high hopes the Sixth Committee was not able to resolve the issue.
The reference to the General Assemblies note in Resolution 489 (V) reminded all that
the "General Assembly had stated that it had not yet been able to take a final decision
regarding the setting up of such a court. It would remain a political decision" (UN
Doc A/2186 Add.I: Article 46).
The Committee's mandate was extended, memberships changed, and in 1953
it produced a revised text (Bassiouni, 1999). The revised text was even less optimistic
and added provisions that limited jurisdiction and did not bind states. One provision
also gave states the ability to withdraw jurisdiction when the court was conferred. The
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Draft was submitted to the General Assembly. However, the General Assembly felt
compelled to first consider the ILC's Draft Code of Offences, which to date was not
completed. The outcome of the 1953 Committee's proposal put a damper on hope for
an ICC that many held (Francis Biddle, Justice Jackson, Henri Donnedieu de Vabres,
Sir Fyfe, and Telford Taylor). Many states had succeeded.in again postponing
accountability at the international level. Only three of the seventeen representatives
(the Netherlands, France, and Israel) advocated a permanent empowered ICC
(Bassiouni, 1973). The statute for an ICC was thus tabled again until the completion
of the Code of Offences.
In 1954, the ILC completed the draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and
Security; however, a consensus could still not be reached on a draft for an ICC
(Hampson, 2002). The Final Draft Code consisted of only four articles (UN Doc
A/2693, 1954). Article Two of the draft code outlines 13 offences including
unprovoked state aggression on another state, generating civil strife in another state,
political or economic coercion, genocide and other human rights violations, and
violations of the laws of war. Article Three refuses to excuse someone acting as Head
of State from culpability. Article Four, in direct response to issues which arose in the
Nuremberg trials, clearly states that:
The fact that a person charged with an offense defined in the Code acted in
pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him
of responsibility in international law, if the circumstances at the time, it was
possible for him not to comply with that order.

58
Now, under international law, not only is a citizen theoretically or morally obligated
to question orders to engage in aggression or illegal acts, but also they are legally
responsible to do so if they want to protect themselves from prosecution. Such a·
condition greatly bothered many nations, like the United States, that continued to seek
immunity from the culpability of their actions on the international stage.
Missing from this draft was any mention of an ICC as well as the
controversial definition for aggression (UN Doc N2693, 1954). What appeared as
hope for the Committee for establishing an ICC would soon disintegrate. The Sixth
Committee of the UN reviewed the Draft and the only consensus that could be
reached was that no decision could be made on the Code of Offences. The Committee
further requested that an enlarged Committee should be created to define aggression.
This committee was composed of nineteen members who were to report back in 1956
(Ferencz, 1999). This further extended the 1953's Committee's draft for an ICC for
consideration.
In summary, following WWII the "international society" became distended.
International law was viewed as essential for more than inter-State relations. The
realization that no court had been formed to penalize the mass atrocities and
international violations of WWII due to previous conflicts between states over issues
of international law and issues of sovereignty was more than evident for the "victor
allies". The position of the US on international law and penalization had taken a tum
for the first time since the late 1800's. The US Representative, Justice Robert
Jackson, headed the IMT. Jackson believed fully in the rule of law and sought to
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establish the same standard for international law through forming the Nuremberg
Principles: universal international law that was viewed as bothjus cogens and erga
omnes. For the Victors, issues of sovereignty for Germany no longer were significant
enough to allow Germany to prosecute their own under domestic law. An
international body to penalize was viewed favorably. The form it was to take
however, remained a topic of controversy and the result again was an ad hoc IMT.
The codification of the Nuremberg Principles reflected a changing ideology.
International law was used and portrayed as universal. The ideology for an
internationaT society became more predominant. This included language used by non
governmental organizations that focused on international humanitarian laws perceived
as an inherent right for all mankind. The Nuremberg Principles conveyed a cultural
message even though there was not a permanent ICC for enforcement. The
Nuremberg Trials and the creation of the United Nations brought with it the
•
continuation of previous attempts to create an ICC and an enlargement of

"international society" as NGO's joined the political realm and membership in the
UN expanded. The argument of international law as inter-State was no longer a
prevailing ideology. However, issues of jurisdiction, sovereignty, and erga omnes
remained sources of conflict for many states.
1956-1973-The Cold War Intermission
Although many other committees were formed every few years (1954-1957;
1959-1967; and 1967-1974) with the task of defining aggression and formatting a
Draft of Offences, the political climate only hampered their success (Bassiouni,
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1997). During this time the Draft for an ICC lay dormant. As different bodies worked
separately at different venues (Geneva and New York), divergent texts were produced
and submitted at different times. It became an easy solution for the General Assembly
to table successive drafts as one or the other committees had not finished its task.
Another reason the Drafts were continually tabled was due to the political will of the
five "superpowers" "(e.g., China, France, the UK, the USA, and the USSR) that were
in conflict and mostly in opposition to the establishment of an ICC as the world was
at a position of division and at risk for war (Bassiouni, 1999). It was the era of the
Cold War; mistrust ran rampant. The French were involved in a bitter conflict with
Vietnam, which the US supported financially and militarily. Many states, the Soviet
Union, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were
concerned that an ICC would interfere with their internal affairs.
"The chilling winds of the Cold War had placed the idea of an International
Criminal Court into the deep freeze by the end of 1954. There it was to remain
until the warming breeze of detente between the major powers would allow it
to thaw, more than a century later" (Ferencz, 1999: 48).
International conflicts continued to erupt. War between the North and South
Vietnam exploded. Soviet troops invaded Hungary. War broke out in the Middle East.
The French sent troops to the Suez. The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred. Cyprus
erupted in violence. The US invaded Cambodia. Pakistan and India were in conflict.
The Six-day war occurred. Pakistan was involved in mass atrocities. Bangladesh
suffered the loss of thousands that were massacred. It appeared that the last agenda for
this epoch in history was to define aggression or establish an ICC, as so many states
were busy committing aggression, ensuring their interests, and refusing to consider a
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higher legal authority of constraint against them. In the interim, the UN consistently
pointed to atrocities in the world that violated the Nuremberg Principles. However,
due to their lack of enforcement power the UN was limited to symbolic gestures of
vocal condemnation and patronizing the violators.
To sum up, during the cold war the US fell back on its earlier positions of self
interest, sovereignty, and inter-State international law (the role of the Security
Council in the UN is an illustration of these concerns). The work toward an ICC
continued in the Commissions set forth by the UN, which included the processes of
codifying international law and defining the Crimes Against Humanity Offences over
the next decade. However, the US remained adamant that it would not accept or
support an empowered permanent ICC at the height of the cold war. In the interim
conflicts arose and the international society again found itself in strife as states
committed aggression on other states, pursued their interests, and invaded territories
of others.
1974-1997-International Ideology Begins to Shift
With the end of the Vietnam War, some of the tensions between the major
powers subsided; however, violence still erupted in the Middle East. Public outcries,
involvement of NGO's, and efforts by scholars and statesmen seemed to spark the
movement of the Special Committee to define Aggression (Ferencz, 1999). On
December 14th 1974, the definition of aggression made it to the UN General
Assembly and was accepted by consensus. Although the definition was ambiguous
and left itself open for individual state interpretation, the barrier to consider an ICC
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had been "officially" removed. The Legal Counsel of the UN, Professor Suy,
approached the delegates with the reminder that the time for considering the Draft
Code (now over 20 years old) and an ICC was upon them. Many states responded.
The US considered expanding the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in
a Senate Resolution. The State Department recommended the US repeal the Connally
Amendment and accept jurisdiction of the World Court (Ferencz, 1999). Of course,
this would still fail to achieve what other states were attempting to establish: a
permanent criminal court with compulsory jurisdiction and empowerment. Secretary
General Waldheim presented a report to the Assembly for all states to accept
compulsory jurisdiction and "to withdraw the extensive and self-defeating
reservations" (Waldheim, 1974: in Ferencz, 1999: 77).
In July of 1977, the ILC reminded the General Assembly that Resolution 1186
(xii) of 1954 had been deferred until aggression had been defined and suggested it
should review the topics for a Draft Code of Offences and a Draft for an ICC again
(Ferencz, 1999). Several states, Mexico, Panama, Syria, Phillipines, Barbados, Fiji,
Nigeria, and Cyprus agreed and pushed for the reopening of attempts to conclude the
Drafts. The proposal sat until 1978 for reconsideration. The International Association
of Penal Law continued to promote a criminal code and an ICC. Among its members,
M. Cherif Bassiouni and Ved Nando, of the US were the strongest supporters to
further the work that had began over twenty years ago. The General Assembly again
tabled the suggestion to reopen the Committees work on a draft Code of Offences and
an ICC due to the underlying controversy surrounding the growth of the UN (from
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less than sixty members in the 1950's to over 150 members in the late 1970's) (UN
Doc A/33/45 Supp No. 45, 1978/79).
In 1981, the General Assembly again formally requested that the ILC work on
the Draft Code of Crimes. Members of the ILC reiterated the need to establish a
mechanism to act as a constraint and enforcement of the upcoming implementations.
Continuous appeals to the General Assembly were made by the ILC to consider again
the Draft for an ICC. However, it would take several more years, filled with changes
in geopolitical relations, before the GA reacts to the ILC's requests. The 1980's
indicated a change in world attitudes among many states. The US-Soviet hostilities
had declined. The USSR General Secretary Gorbechev sent a letter to the UN
proposing the establishment of a global security plan that included strengthening
enforcement of the rule of international law. Transnational Corporations were
expanding at a rapid pace and many states felt a legal mechanism needed to be formed
for constraint and control of transnational actors (Hampson, 2002). New forms of
perceived security threats encouraged states to consider an ICC to control terrorism,
drug trafficking, and hijacking. In December 1988, the General Assembly asked the
ILC to consider the Code of Offences implementation. In 1989, a Coalition of sixteen
Latin American and Caribbean states (headed by Trinidad and Tobago) requested the
UN address the growing problem of drug trafficking (Bassiouni, 1999; Sadat, 2002).
The General Assembly convened a special session addressing these problems.
Trinidad and Tobago proposed that a specialized international criminal court be

created. The General Assembly made an official request for the ILC to prepare a
report on establishing an ICC for drug trafficking offenders.
Contemporaneously, the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences in conjunction with the UN (Chaired by M. Cherif Bassiouni) prepared a
draft statute for an ICC with jurisdiction over all international crimes. This draft was
submitted to the Eight United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Treatment
of Offenders in 1990 and further recommended that the ILC consider this draft
(Bassiouni, 1999). The ILC had also completed their report that the General Assembly
had assigned them in 1989 and submitted it to the forty-fifth session of the General
Assembly. The report did not limit the concept of a court to drug trafficking, but was
expanded to include a more universal criminal court that would cover other forms of
international crimes (Bassiouni, 1999). The General Assembly requested the ILC
continue to prepare a comprehensive statute for an ICC. The ILC had also adopted a
Draft code of Crimes in 1991 (Sadat, 2002).
In 1992, the ILC created a working group, Chaired by Abdul Koroma of Sierra
Leone, to specifically work on a statute for an ICC. The ILC working group submitted
a report composed of several propositions which included: an ICC be established in
the form of a treaty agreed upon by state parties; the court's jurisdiction would only
cover crimes defined by international treaties in force; should not be compulsory;
should be in the form of an ad hoc body and; must guarantee due process,
independence, and impartiality (Sadat, 2002). The proposals were primarily based on
the work of the 1951 and 1953 committees and were later adopted into the 1994 Draft
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statute issued by the ILC. The General Assembly received the 1992 recommendations
of the ILC at its Forty-Seventh session. The General Assembly granted the ILC a
mandate to elaborate the statute as "a matter of priority" (UN GA Res 4 7/33 in Sadat,
2002:39). The Draft Code of Crimes had met the usual support and resistance that
was to coincide with the development of an ICC. The US was one of the objectors.
The US dissatisfaction was centered on issues over the lack of a definition for
aggression9. Some revisions did occur between the 1992 draft and the 1994 draft
(these revisions included jurisdiction limitations and other technical changes to suit
political objections by the major world powers made at the General Assembly
session) (Bassiouni, 1999).
During 1993 and 1995 the Security council was addressing atrocities and war
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, mass genocide that occurred in Rwanda,
and Iraq's violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) which aided the sense
of urgency for the General Assembly to create an ICC (Bassiouni, 1999). Ad hoc
Tribunals were eventually established for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. This was the first
time since WWII that the states came together as a body to provide investigations and
prosecutions of violations of international law. However, the Security Council was
becoming less willing to continue the processes of ad hoc Tribunals due to the
complexities of reaching consensus on the procedures or desires for a IMT
(International Military Tribunal) and because of the veto power of the Security
Council which allowed the selectivity of cases that would be eligible for IMT
9

Aggression had been defined by the Special Committee to Define Aggression in 1974 and was
accepted with consensus by the UN. However, it remained vague and ambiguous. The definition for
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(Bassiouni, 1999). The growing concerns about creating IMTs brought many
members of the United Nations to support a permanent ICC. Many states still held
reservations on the plausibility for acceptance of an ICC without a universal desire of
state leaders (especially since the US was reluctant to provide any support or
leadership in the development or acceptance of an ICC). During George H. W. Bush's
Administration, such hesitancy was a matter of US Foreign Policy. The concern was
intensified with the International Court of Justice's adverse ruling in the Nicaragua
case as well as the potential threat of undermining the State department's existing
internationai "law enforcements" (Bassiouni, 1999).
The Clinton Administration displayed a diplomatic interest in the
development of an ICC by participating in the creation of an ICC that would also be
suited to US interests (this entailed ensuring limitations on jurisdiction and the
Security Council's decisions for charges of crimes). Essentially, the US played a role
to ensure it would not be subjected to the jurisdiction of the court's power or authority
without state consent to protect itself from prosecution against any violations of
international law that occurred as the US pursued its economic and foreign policy
interests. The insistence on the Security Council having a role in the cases to be tried
under the ICC jurisdiction was to ensure veto power for the US to exercise if a case
was brought forward against the US, its current allies, or foreign policy interests.
Two drafts for an ICC were drawn up by the ILC in 1994 addressing different
political concerns. The final agreed upon report was ready to be submitted to the

aggression was not codified within international law, treaties, or a resolution.

General Assembly. However, the report remained ambiguous about certain
controversial topics such as the financing of the court, definition of crimes to be
covered by the court, jurisdictional matters, and the organizational structure (Sadat,
2002). The 1994 ILC's final report on the statute for an ICC was submitted to the
Forty-Ninth Session of the General Assembly (GA), which tabled consideration until
the Fiftieth Session (Bassiouni, 1999). However, the GA did form an ad hoc
committee to discuss the substantive and administrative issues of the ILC's report: the
1995 Ad Hoc Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
(chaired by the Ministry of foreign Affairs for the Netherlands) (Res 49/53). In the
Resolution forming the Ad Hoc Committee, the GA separated the ILC's 1994 Draft
Statute for an ICC and it's 1991 Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of
Mankind. This was done in response to the amount of members working on each draft
as well as the number of participants (NGO's and GO's not formally in committee
membership but able to put forth proposals)
The Ad Hoc Committee met twice in 1995 (April thru August) to review the
Commission's report on the establishment of an ICC and rendered their report back to
the GA (Sadat, 2002; Bassiouni, 1999). Upon receiving the results from the Ad Hoc
Committee, the GA set forth to establish the 1996 Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court. The Ad Hoc committee continued
to focus on the feasibility of establishing an ICC while the Preparatory Committee
focused on the text of such a court.
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The meetings held by the Preparatory Committee consisted of an open forum
for all members of the United Nations, and for specialized agencies in international
law or humanitarian efforts (Bassiouni, 1999). These groups consisted of the
International Institute of Higher Studies, members of the Bureau and working group
from the Netherlands, NGO's (30 organizations began the Coalition for a Criminal
Court in 1995 and grew to over 800 NGO's within three years), Australia, Austria,
Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chili, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lesotho, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad,
Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela (Bassiouni, 1999 Vol 3:623; Shelton, 2000). All of
them played significant roles in advancing the concept for an ICC.
A preliminary report that compiled various proposals was submitted to the
General Assembly at the Fifty-First session in 1996 requesting an extension for the
Preparatory Committee to negotiate proposals made to them to consolidate into a text
for a statute. The GA complied and extended the original date of 1996 to 1998
passing Resolution 51/207 for holding a diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries in
1998 (Cooper, 2002). With the renewed mandate from the GA, the Prepatory
Committee set about formulating the list and definitions of crimes, principles of law
and penalties, court's organization, procedures, trigger mechanisms, state cooperation,
relationship of court to the UN, and financial matters. The potential for establishing
an ICC was viewed in a more positive light, which sparked a stage of negotiations
over the next two years. The Prepatory Committee had six official meetings between
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those years. In April 1998, the Committee had finalized a draft statute to be
considered at the convening 1998 Diplomatic conference (Cassesse, 2002).
The range of participation to establish an ICC by states, inter-governmental,
and non-governmental organizations indicates the assortment of interests. The variety
of interests from multiple actors will later result in lengthy and contentious
discussions over the complexities involved in establishing an ICC in lieu of the
existing conflicts contained within the realm of contradictions of an "international
society".
"'

To sum up, by the 1970's and 1980's many of the conflicts of international
society had lessoned and members of the international society continued to push for
an empowered ICC. This included NGO's, the ILC, International Institute of Higher
Studies in Criminal Science, the USSR, Trinidad, and Tobago. However, the issues of
a court with universality and an international society composed of sovereign states,
(some) unwilling to relinquish their impermeable borders to a system of universal
international law, remained a conflict and ensured major obstacles for the work on the
ICC in the 1990's.
The 1990' s represent a major historical contingency: new legal approaches to
the conflicts of international society resurfaced with a renewed verve. During the
1996 PrepCom Reports, a large number of contending proposals were submitted.
These contained various national positions regarding sovereignty, common law
systems, civil law systems, divergent crimes to be covered, penalties applied by the
Court, role of the Security Council, the role of the Prosecutor, and other major issues

that had divided earlier progress for an ICC (GA Fifty first session, 1996). These
same controversial topics were again at the center of debate during the 1998
conference of plenipotentiaries. Although the US was an active participant in the
negotiations and formation of proposals for an ICC in the 1990's, the position of the
US (during the Clinton Administration) remained intent on ensuring the ICC did not
impede upon the sovereignty of the US or interfere with any US foreign policy or
practices. Much of the US support could be viewed as self-interested or symbolic.
Many of the political gestures that were made during the negotiations were designed
to appease tiie conflicting LMS positions. The result of the six PrepCom meetings
was the disaggregating of the former proposals into a workable set of compromises
for the 1998 Plenipotentiaries Meeting.

Summary
From the onset, attempts to establish an ICC were met with resistance. To
relinquish territorial domestic law to a universality of international law would have
required states to accept universal jurisdiction versus international law governing only
inter-State issues. The result would have endangered the sovereignty that many states
saw as essential for their safety, political interests, and political or national ideologies.
The core element of this conflict arises from the contradiction of an "international
society". Territories, borders, government, and domestic judicial systems have
fundamentally been viewed as the foundation of states. International law was founded
on/and with acceptance of statehood and state sovereignty.
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The earliest international treaties, charters, customs, and laws were based
solely on inter-state relations (UN Doc, 2003). The attempt to create a universality of
international common good, international common law, and an ICC with universal
jurisdiction for an international society implied a need for porous state borders. The
contradiction of sovereign of states structuring an international society versus the
ideology of a unified international society has resulted in decades of conflicts over the
attempts to establish an ICC.
These conflicts and the fundamental contradiction of international society led
to ad hoc international systems of justice (IMT, World Court of Justice, Court of
Arbitration, and non-empowered international organizations) rather than an
empowered universal criminal court. All of these international organizations are the
result of attempts to address specific conflicts (Franco-Prussian War, WWI, WWII,
Assassination of Leaders, Terrorism, Drug Trafficking). Customary international law,
treaties, and Charters have historically been viewed asjus cogens. However,
international law was initiated and advanced under the premise of independent
sovereign states and as a frame for inter-State relations. Thus, it often failed to
achieve the level of erga omnes. This coupled with a non-empowered universal
system of justice resulted in the failure of these organizations to constrain future
conflicts.
Historical attempts to establish an international system of justice that is
empowered and universalistic have illustrated how the contradictions of an
international society constrain the potential outcome for such an institution. What has
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resulted from the conflicts that arose as a result of these international contradictions
are ad hoc entities, non-empowered systems of justice, and the establishment of new
international laws without a corresponding change in ideology within international
society and/or international law (during the late 1800' s through the 1930' s).
As contemporary efforts were made to establish ari ICC, the presence of a
changing ideology yielded new principles used to guide international law. This
change in values or principles is evident in the rhetoric used within international
organizations such as the UN, Amnesty International, Human Rights Organizations,
and the International Law Association, which refer to international society and
existing relations as a community. This expresses a naturalistic view as well as
common goals, interests, values, and ethos that are shared among all members.
However, this new ideology (principle and value) remains in direct conflict with the
composition of international society and the relations between states. At the base of
the contradiction between international society and the ideal type or ideology of
international society are the issues of sovereign rule (Austinian concept) and
jurisdiction. Rather than attempting to resolve the underlying contradiction of the
structure and ideology of international relations, the ideological principles and goals
for a unified international society was injected into attempts to establish an ICC.
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CHAPTER Ill:
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The previously discussed Prepatory Committee Meetings (held during 19951997) provided the frame for the Rome Statute Diplomatic Conference of 1998. This
chapter begins with a discussion of the Rome Conference focusing on the contentious
subject of jurisdiction and state sovereignty. This is followed by a section giving a
descriptive account of the current status of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. The following segment examines the US reaction to the ICC
followed by a brief summary of the chapter.

The Rome Conference
June 15th 1998 marked the end of decades of work to establish an ICC and the
commencement of a five week Diplomatic Conference that resulted in the Rome
Statute of an International Criminal Court. The large number of delegates presented
many difficulties for the process of the Conference. Informal working groups and
"informal-informal working groups" were created to address various articles of the
working draft statute (Bassiouni, 1999: 628). The piecemeal construction of these
articles and working in six languages made it difficult for the Committee to maintain
consistency and attain consensus. The most contentious subject matters (Part II,
Articles 5-21) were not discussed until the final sessions. These included all the major
political issues that created conflict: definition of crimes, jurisdiction, the role of the
Security Council, and the role of the prosecutor (Bassiouni, 1999).
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Significant conflicts occurred over resolving issues of the Court's jurisdiction
and its ability to exercise that jurisdiction (Cassesse, 2002). States held incompatible
views regarding the role of the Court. As previously mentioned, the issue of
jurisdiction was a major constraint that inhibited previous attempts to establish an
ICC as well as a major contention in the development of the Rome Statute. This is
due to several factors. From the theoretical frame of critical international law,
jurisdiction symbolizes the root of the contradiction between international relations
(international society as it is) and the ideology or ideal type of international society
presented in principle (the ought, not the is, of international relations). This includes
the current composition of international society (independent sovereign states based
on self governing and ultimate authority: the Austinian model of positivism) and the
principles that are portrayed as consensus, common values, goals, and interests
(naturalism and the innate consciousness of absolute norms)10•
Many states supported universal jurisdiction of the Court, ensuring a universal
justice while other states (mainly the US) insisted that the acceptance of the ICC's
jurisdiction by states was a necessary precondition to jurisdiction. These two positions
were heavily debated and resulted in a compromise that was not fully satisfactory to
either of the conflicting forces; the "like minded states" (LMS11) that wanted
universal jurisdiction and the US (the main challenger) that wanted a system based on
compliance at will. The US was firmly grounded in the Austinian concept of

10

See appendix for chart.
Like Minded states include those states that want a court based on universal jurisdiction and have
legal traditions based on civil law. This is discussed in greater detail in the following analysis regarding
the debate and compromise of jurisdictional matters during the Rome Conference.
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sovereignty, which holds to the traditional composition of international relations and
international law. Although these research data do not provide the dialogues of debate
surrounding this issue, the outcome reflects the compromises of the different
positions. The result was Article 1, the court, which lays out the concept of
jurisdiction in the form of a complimentary Court to natio.nal courts. It states,
An International Crimjnal Court ("the Court") is hereby established. It shall be
a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred
to in this Statute, and shall be complimentary to national criminal
jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed
by the provisions of this Statute.
The idiom of this Article portrays how both sides of the underlying contradiction
(between the tradition of sovereign state relations and the principles representing the
ideology of a consensual society) can be represented within the creation of new laws
which can then lead to further conflicts (Chambliss, 1993).
Although there was a general consensus that crimes of genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity should be covered by the court's jurisdiction·, there were
conflicts over the scope of crimes covered under war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and the definition for crimes of aggression. Despite the fact that precedence had been
set for the definition of aggressive crimes during the IMT of the Nuremberg
defendants and in the General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of December 1974
(passed with a consensus for the definition of aggression) it remained an irresolvable
issue for the Committee Meeting members. This precedent definition was "the use of
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political

independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the United
Nations (Quoted from Harris, 1999:579).
During the process of negotiations of the Rome Statute in June 1998, US
Ambassador Bill Richardson reminded conference members that all though the US
supported the IMT trials of Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the acceptance of any definitions
or attempts to further define acts of aggression was premature for purposes of
individual criminal responsibility (Harris, 1999). He suggested it be tabled and the
court limited to jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes to
prevent reoccurrences of those crimes. Due to lack of compromise, jurisdiction over
crimes of aggression was dismissed until a final provision is adopted that defines
aggression, thus the Court's jurisdiction (to date, this remains undefined). This
declaration is included within Article 5 (2) (described below).
Crimes of aggression were not the only controversial crime debated during the
Conference. The US Delegates insisted that the Court's jurisdiction should only occur
(if a state was signatory) when war crimes were committed on a large scale (Sadat,
2002). This would mean that war crimes would essentially also have to be crimes
against humanity before the Court could interject its jurisdiction. The US was
triumphant in this debate and the condition of jurisdiction over war crimes was
included in Article 8 (1) as a part of Part 2 Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable
Law. Article 8 (1) states,
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The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of
such crimes.
The other crimes falling under the Court's jurisdiction that were agreed to include
genocide and crimes against humanity. These are included in Article 5, crimes within
the jurisdiction of the court that states,
1. The jurisdiction of the court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction
in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a) The
crime of genocide; (2) Crimes against humanity; (3) War crimes; and (d) The
crime··of aggression.
2. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the
crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise
jurisdiction with respect to this crime.
These crimes are defined in Article 6 (genocide), Article 7 (crimes against humanity),
and Article 8 (war crimes) of the Rome statute. Crimes against humanity are
reinforcement to the ideological principles of inalienable rights (naturalism) and the
ethos of an international society) while at the same time are limited by an
"enforcement jurisdiction which is paltry at best" (Sadat, 2002: 103). The weak
enforcement jurisdiction is the result of the conflict between this ideology and the
traditional structure of international relations and international law 12.
Crimes listed within the Rome Statute specifically refer to individual
culpability versus an organization or state. This is defined within Article 1 and Article
12

This is the same ongoing philosophical and legal debate between naturalism and positivism that has
occurred for centuries. Under international law, positivism has been the traditional form of
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25 of the Rome Statute. However, the ability of a state or organizational entity to be
prosecuted has been a long-standing point of debate going back to the Nuremberg
IMTs where it was argued "international crimes are committed by men not by abstract
entities" (Sadat, 2002:778). During the process of meetings the French delegate
introduced a proposal for the inclusion of organizations. Thus, one Draft Statue
contained an Article that would subject legal entities to the Court's jurisdiction if the
crimes were committed on behalf of such legal persons or their agencies or
representatives. In the eno this was dismissed as contradictory to the principle of a
complimentary system (Sadat, 2002). The result is Article 25 (1,2,3, and 4) Individual
Criminal Responsibility which states,
(1) The court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this
Statute.
(2) A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be
individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this
Statute.
(3) In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.
(4) No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility
shall affect the responsibility of States under international law.
Even though concerns regarding the contradiction of a complimentary system were
addressed, part 4 of this Article does ensure that the Court's exclusion of state
responsibility is not precluded from customary international law or treaties
obligations. Again, this represents the traditions of international law and international
interpretation. However, the issue of jurisdiction remains at the heart of these conflicting paradigms
and at the center of debate at each attempt to establish an ICC.
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relations based on sovereign rule as the dominant principle guiding new laws while
being placed within a system that represents the ideology of an international society
with common ethos, goals, and principles.
Matters of jurisdiction regarding the role of the ICC and national prosecution
for crimes were also a contentious subject as many states believed supporting national
prosecution would enable impunity and shield perpetrators of crimes to protect their
state interests (Cassesse, 2002). The US circulated an informal "paper" questioning
whether the ICC should include domestic amnesty under jurisdiction (Meintjies,
1999). The issue of domestic amnesty was viewed by some as an opportunity for
states to grant impunity to individuals that had committed heinous crimes and by
others as a resource for healing the nation (Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
held in South Africa). The inclusion of this would have further limited the jurisdiction
of the Court and given greater powers to decisions of states regarding perpetrators of
the most serious crimes listed in Article 5. Although the actual tete-a-tete of the
debate is missing in this research, the outcome is clear as Domestic Amnesty was
omitted from the Rome Statute. However, the concerns over misuse of domestic

.

amnesty were indirectly covered under Article 17 (b) called Issues of Admissibility. It
states,
The case has been investigated by a state which has jurisdiction over it and the
State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the 'decision
resulted from unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.
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Other modifications entered into the Rome Statute as a result of the five weeks of
meetings included providing a format for challenging jurisdiction of the Court or
admissibility of a case. This is included in Article 19 (2). It states,
Challenges to the admissibility of a case on the grounds referred to in article
17 or challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by (b) A State
which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or
prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted.
This Article ensures a state its rights of sovereignty for its domestic legal system and
re-emphasizes the complimentary nature of the Court. This supports the tradition of
internationa! relations and sovereign determinism while negating the principle behind
ensuring impunity does not occur.
The support for traditions of inter-state relations and international law that
conflict with the ideological principles of universality and the mission of the Rome
Statute is also evident in Article 98, The Cooperation with Respect to Waiver of
Immunity and Consent to Surrender. Many of the delegates within the Prepatory
Commission to the Rome Statute had apprehensions regarding conflicts between
Article 98 of the Rome Statute with previous international agreements. It is for this
reason Article 98 recognizes previously dated bilateral agreements concerning the
surrender of an individual from a state party to an alternative third party. Article 98 of
the Rome Statute states:
The court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require
the requested state to act inconsistently with its obligations under international
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to
surrender a person of that state to the Court (Rome Statute, Article 98).

81
The intention of Article 98 was to allow the court the attainment of waivers of
immunity for prosecution prior to individuals being surrendered over to the ICC if
that individual was covered under an existing international agreement (CICC
Publication, 2002). The delegates intended to address any conflicts between the Rome
Statute and pre-existing international agreements or new agreements based on ones
with set precedence such as Status of Force Agreements (SOFA) 13 or the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (UN Doc.NCONF.20/13 1961). 14 This Article
later becomes the focus of debate for the international society (and will be discussed
in the section of the US reactions to the ICC).
The position of the US for supporting the ICC was evident during the final
days of the Rome Conference. On July16th 1998 the US submitted a proposal, which
would have further limited the Court's jurisdiction "over all acts committed in the
course of official duties and acknowledged by the State as such" (Scheffer, 1998 in
Cassesse, 2002: V.I: 601). The US would not bend on its insistence that the
acceptance of state nationality was a necessary pre-condition to the Court's
jurisdiction (Sadat, 2002). The final compromise was that the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction be limited to territorial state signatories or state of nationality signatories.
This compromise became Article 12 of the Rome Statute called the Precondition to
the Exercise of Jurisdiction. Article 12 states,
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in Article 5.
13 SOFA are jurisdictional agreements that give the sending state or receiving state a primary right to exercise its
jurisdiction over certain crimes. If a state party would have an obligation to surrender an individual (e.g. US national)
to the court the individual would be transferred to US jurisdiction versus an international World Court or third state
14

For more detailed information on the Article 98 impunity agreements see the CICC. This includes
states reactions and detailed analysis on the bilateral agreements.
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2. In case of Article 13 15 , paragraph (a) or (c), the court may exercise its
jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or
have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The .State on the Territory of which the conduct in question
occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft,
the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
The only exception to this Article is when the Security Council, which then gives
universality of jurisdiction, refers a case (Article 13 (b)). This compromise (at the
insistence of the US) fulfilled two issues. One was the demand for the Security
Council to have a role. This is a significant compromise when one considers the veto
power of the "Five Members" of the Security Council in ensuring their interests or
referral for a case that can be eliminated vis a vis veto power. It compromises the
LMS's desire for universal jurisdiction while at the same time satisfying the US with
the second part of Article 12, which is the precondition of a state to consent to being a
participant of the ICC (the complimentary court to national proceedings versus the
universal court). Article 13 proclaims how the Court may exercise these jurisdictional
rights on the territory of a State Party with four subsections. These include
jurisdiction of the Court if a referral by a state party or the Prosecutor is made and/or
the Security Council makes a referral. The second condition is for crimes committed
on the territory of a non-State Party, which includes jurisdiction if a referral by a State
Party or the Prosecutor is initiated and/or a referral from the Security Council.

15

Article 13 details the Court's jurisdiction for prosecution of crimes under Article 5.

Article 12 is also a manifestation of the sovereignty principle. As a
complimentary system, states have primacy over their own territories, which limit the
territory of the Court's jurisdiction. The aspect of a complimentary system will vastly
restrain the Court's jurisdiction and limits the authority and legitimacy 16 of the Court.
In effect, the Court has resulted in being a consent-based system versus a universal
system based onjus cogens and erga omnes. The US was one of the greatest objectors
to a universal court and had attained a portion of its interests by the compromises that
resulted in Article 12. Yet, even with the concessions for the pre-condition of state
consent regarding jurisdiction, Article 12 was still viewed as highly problematic for
the US (this is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter). As previously
stated, the compromises of jurisdiction have greatly weakened the jurisdictional
powers of the Court and the US opposition is at best ill placed. This is stated well by
Cassesse
Against this background it remains astonishing that the United States
continues to oppose the weak compromise of Article 12 and has, since the
Rome Conference, explored various ways and formulas to alter Article 12 or
to make it inapplicable with regard to US Nationals" (Cassesse, 2002: VI:
614).
With jurisdiction, the concept of automatic authority for the Court upon
signature remained an issue. The US (and a limited number of other states including
France) wanted an opt-out option for the Court's jurisdiction (Sadat, 2002). This
would further limit the court's jurisdiction and strengthen the position of sovereign
Legitimacy in its simplest form refers to conformity with the law. "Unlike legality, legitimacy refers
to the ought and not just the is of law" (Carty, 1998). It also refers to the perceived view of an
institution as valid and acceptable (Scott, et al 1986).
16
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state determinism. The final outcome was a compromise promoted by Japan: Article
124 of the Rome Statute called the Transitional Provisions. It states,
Notwithstanding article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, a State, on becoming a party
to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of seven years after the entry into
force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction
of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 when
a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory. A
declaration under this article may be withdrawn at any time. The provision of
this article shall be reviewed at the Review Conference in accordance with
article 123, paragraph 1.
Although the conversations and debates were inaccessible for this research, the result
of this appears to address both, the tradition of state sovereignty and international law
-

as consensually based inter-state contracts.
Beyond the concerns for an opt in-opt out option, states were concerned about
their past actions being subject to the Court's jurisdiction. The concern over ex post
facto is not a new trend. The claim to immunity for acts committed ex post facto was
used as the defense for the Nazi war criminals during the IMTs. It is not surprising
that these concerns resurface during the creation of an ICC. The concerns are
addressed in Article 11, which limits the Court's jurisdiction to crimes committed
after the Statute enters into force (for the ratifying State Party). Article 11 states,
(1) The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the
entry into force of this Statute.

(2) If a state becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court
may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the
entry into force of this Statute for that State, unless that State has made a
declaration under Article 12, paragraph 3.
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Many compromises had been made, however, this does not mean that these
compromises were acceptable to the opposing actors. Instead many of these
compromises represent Chambliss' concept of symbolic politics which incorporates
the adaptation of a proposed law by making it malleable to other proposals and
erroneously consecrated as shared interests. This was mariifested in the final hours of
the Rome Conference.
Friday, July 1?1h 1998 was the final day for the delegates of the Committee of
the Whole to finalize the most contentious articles. At the deadline hour, the US and
•
India attempted to introduce amendments to the proposal which would have collapsed

the Conference and ended the chance for an ICC (Bassiouni, 1999). India requested
limitations on the role of the Security Council and a prohibition of all nuclear
weapons. The US requested further limitations on the Court's jurisdiction (which
were only supported by China and Qatar) to restrict the compromises of jurisdiction
already made and to call for unrecorded votes at the last minutes on July 17 th
(Cassesse, 2002). Had the US been successful in attaining action, the ICC conference
would have been shut down and rescheduled for later. The last minute effort to thwart
the establishment of an ICC by the US was only the first of many to come (Bassiouni,
1999).
A no action vote was introduced and the US and India proposals were not
addressed (out of 161 registered delegates 155 voted for the no action motion and
acceptance of the proposed draft of the Committee). The Committee of the whole
adjourned and the final session of the Plenary was convened for a quick formal
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session to adopt the Rome Statute (Bassiouni, 1999). The US (David Scheffer, US
Delegate) held to its opposition and requested another vote on the previous last
minute proposals (Harris, 1999; Bassiouni, 1999). At the insistence of the US a final
vote was taken and 120 delegations voted in favor of the Rome Statute (seven voted
against and twenty one abstained from voting), the Final Act of the Diplomatic
Conference, and to open for signature July 181\ (CICC, 2003). Those opposed to the
Rome Statute included India, Iraq, Israel, Libyan Arab Jamchiriya, Qatar, China, and
the US. The final vote represented the end of years of efforts to establish a Statute for
an ICC.

·-

The Rome Statute of the ICC: Descriptive Information
The Rome Statute required sixty states to become signatories by December
31st 2000 (Article 126) for the Statute to enter force. That goal was far exceeded with
139 state signatories at the closing date. The International Criminal Court became a
reality on July 1, 2002 with more than 120 nations attending the final Prepatory
Commission Meetings.
The ICC consists of 81 states forming the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) to
the Rome Statue. The endorsement of the Rome Statute requires states to be
signatories and ratified members. The ratification of a state's signature varies with
each state's domestic legal system (e.g. the US would need the approval of the Senate
for the international signature to be ratified). Support of the ICC stands to become
stronger as the 139 states that have endorsed the Rome Statue with their signature
become ratified members (90 states have become ratified members as of 5/2003) in
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accordance with their domestic legal systems. This number excludes the two states
that were signatories but withdrew all support for the ICC: the US and Israel. A few
states have failed to become signatories due to domestic strife, but are willing to
participate in the ICC, such as Kazakhstan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Other states are
adamantly opposed to the ICC such as the Libyan Arab Jainchiriya, India, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iraq, and Myanmar.
The Assembly of States Parties (ASP) met from September 3-10, 2002 to
establish the ongoing agenda, Rules of Procedures, and to elect members of the
Bureau Tasks. In February 2003, the Assembly of States Parties began their first
session to elect the eighteen judges of the Court. The newly elected judges then
appointed the first President of the ICC, the Vice-President, and the second Vice
President. The Prosecutor was sworn in on 16 June 2003 followed by the Registrar on
3 July 2003 (CICC, 2003). On the first year anniversary of the establishment of an
ICC all Senior Officials had been elected. The court is currently near completion of
staff and able to proceed as an international system of justice. The culmination of a
century of aborted attempts and contentious efforts had finally been achieved. Albeit,
the end result of an ICC is less than many states had once fought for (universal
jurisdiction and empowerment) it nonetheless represents a significant change for
international relations and international law. The Preamble to the Rome Statute states
that it is:
Mindful that during this century millions of children, women, and men have
been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity, affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their
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effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level
and enhancing international cooperation, determined to put an end to impunity
for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of
such crimes ...determined to these ends and for the sake of present and future
generations, to establish an independent permanent International Criminal
Court with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole (Rome Statute, July 1999).
The mission statement of the Rome Statute personifies the new ideology of an
international society (with common goals, values, and interests) and the ideological
principle of universal jurisdiction (the Rome statute describes an ability to have
jurisdiction over the most serious crimes but realistically has limitedjurisdiction) 17 •
Indeed, the ICC does represent a change in international relations and international
law. The degree to which the ICC will affect international law is set within the treaty.
However, the question remains to what extent the ICC will influence the relations of
international society without addressing the underlying contradiction between the
ideological international society and current trends of international relations. Simply
stated, the potential for the ICC is reflected in the conflicts that arose in its
establishment over issues of jurisdiction and state sovereignty (though not limited to
these).
In summary, during the process of negotiations of the Plenipotentiaries
Meeting no one state (including the US) was a monolithic obstacle. However, the
proceedings were divided rather conspicuously among those "like minded states
(LMS)" (over sixty states headed by Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom and
NGOs) who wanted universal jurisdiction, expanded definition of war crimes, an
17

See appendix for graph of the contradiction of international society, its ideology and structure, and
jurisdictions place within this system.
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empowered prosecutor, and the exclusion of the Security Council in the Court's
decision, versus the non-LMS such as the US (Iraq, Qatar, and China). One of the
major concessions made with the insistence of the US was the inclusion of a
complimentary cour1:. This ensured that the concept of universality would be
diminished by the recognition of the primacy of domestic courts. Another major
compromise made at the insistence of the US was the need for a state to be a
signatory. This ensured state willingness to participate in the court versus a court
empowered under a universal system of international law governing all of
international society (universal jurisdiction). Again, this reiterates the contradiction of
an international society composed of sovereign states but guided by an ideology of
consensus as well as an international system of laws that are being viewed as both jus
cogens and erga omnes.
The Rome Conference was the result of compromises and efforts from the
PrepCom and Plenipotentiaries Meetings. However, the issues and conflicts remained
last minute battles as states attempted to form the ICC to their ideology and interests.
The same LMS held to their positions and the US continued to oppose many of the
Articles being formed that involved jurisdiction, empowerment, and universality. The
creation of the Rome Statute (in response to conflicts within international society)
was a step to address conflicts occurring between and within states.. However, just as
the structural contradiction model illuminates, attempts to address conflicts vis a vis
law creation, can lead to further conflicts as they ignore the larger structural
contradictions.
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As jurisdiction represents the core contradiction within international society
and international law 18, it is often the central foci of further conflicts. This was the
case with jurisdiction and sovereignty for the Rome Statute development and the ICC.
As international law is a part of the international system, it reflects the fundamental
contradiction, which then becomes inserted into charters, treaties, and resolutions.
Simply stated, international law is the language that states use to attempt to resolve
competing legal interests. This is further complicated with the distinction between law
that finds its origin in a normative will (binding because it is imposed by that will)
and positive law (multifaceted idealistic requirements that are asserted by social
conscience) (Austin, J. 1867). Thus, the issue of jurisdiction is at the root of a
contradiction within international law. For example, the notion of jus cogens and/or
erga omnes represent the principles that there exists a set of norms or morals within
humanity and should thus be represented as compelling. However, erga omnes or
flowing to all contradicts the composition of international society and international
agreements (consensual positivistic model of law).
According to Chambliss's model, the passage of the Rome Statute displays the
symbolic use of politics wherein proposed law (an entire legal institution) is made
malleable to existing proposals and erroneously consecrated as a culmination of
shared interests 19• This is done through consciously designing compromises that do
not hold to the original intentions of the political or legal issue to appease the
opposition. Simply stated, it is the alteration of a proposed law (legal system) that is
18
19

See Appendix for Chart illustrating this contradiction and the place of jurisdiction within this system.
To revisit Chambliss' model see pages 21, 22, 23, and 24.

91
made malleable to opposing legal proposals and then consecrated as "shared interests"
(Chambliss and Katz, 1993). The central compromise involved weakening the court's
jurisdiction to appease the US while maintaining a portion of the original principle
and intention of the Rome Statute: an international criminal court with universality for
the most serious crimes against humanity and those that threaten the very order of
international society.
The passing of the Rome Statute does indeed signify a major change in
political ideology of the international society and for international law. However,
many of the same obstacles that blocked earlier attempts to establish a court were
temporally resolved, not by addressing the contradiction of international society or
international law, but by compromises and the creation of a new system of laws and
justice that is only as strong as the compromises allow. The Rome Conference was a
point in history that revised the existing relationships between states, political
interests, and institutions such as the UN. However, the process of appeasing conflicts
by making malleable the proposals for a universal Court does limit the potentiality of
the ICC (all the while being conveyed as an institution that is a culmination of shared
interests). This revision of political and state relationships has created conflicts due to
the structure and ideology of the ICC in opposition to existing international law and
international societal relations. Thus, new conflicts will and have arose that are
centered on issues of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and erga omnes. These conflicts orbit
around the US in particular.

The United State's Position and Proceedings
A consistent pattern of US positions and objections subsist throughout the
historical efforts to establish an ICC, the development of the Rome Statute, and recent
US policies aimed at thwarting the efficacy of the ICC. Historically, the US
maintained the position that an international system of jus.tice was desirable.
However, the ideology behind establishing an ICC for the US was not all-inclusive.
The US wanted a court for the "others" but insisted the jurisdiction could not impinge
on the US, its policies, or any state actor (see history chapter on WWII efforts to
establish an ICC, Terrorism Treaty, Trinidad and Tobago's call for an ICC, the
development of the Rome Statute, and Congressional Hearings). The issue of
sovereignty has served two primary functions for the US. It has served as an impetus
of protection against being subjected to a universal system of international law and it
has served as a tool for justification and neutralization for the recent US domestic and
foreign policy legislation aimed to ensure the US would be free from prosecution for
even the most heinous crimes against humanity.
The US withdrawal and legislative undermining of the ICC not only reflects
the US ambiguous relationship with international law but also reveals some of the
inherent limitations of the ICC as an international institution of formal social control
that is to represent the common good of the international society vis a vis
international law (e.g. limited jurisdiction). These limitations are reflected in the
previous compromises that were made in the development of the Rome statute and are
centered on the fundamental contradictions of international society (issues of
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sovereignty) and international law (compelling and flowing to all). The position of the
US towards the ICC is contentious at best. The US takes the dubious position that
humanity is best served by the US remaining free from the limitations imposed by the
Rome Statute. US Ambassador Scheffer argued at the international level that,
The consequence imposed by Article 12, particularly for non-parties to the
treaty, will be to limit severely those lawful, but highly controversial and
inherently risky, interventions that the advocates of human rights and world
peace so desperately seek from the United States and other military powers.
There will be significant new legal and political risks in such interventions
(Ambassador Scheffer, 1999)
On July 23 1998, the position of the US was boldly stated in the Committee
-

on Foreign Relations of the One Hundred Fifth Congress Session. The members
present included Senator Helms, Gramm, Ashcroft, Feinstein, and Biden and
Ambassador Scheffer. The International Operations Committee began their
deliberation of the ICC with a statement made by Senator Helms. In his opening
proclamation Helms states:
Given this Court claims universal jurisdiction-in other words, the right to
prosecute United States citizens even though the US is not a party to the
treaty-it important for Congress and the American people to become appraised
of the details regarding the Court ...Now, while I am relieved that the
administration voted against the Treaty in Rome, I am convinced that it is not
in itself sufficient to safeguard our Nation's interests. The United States must
aggressively oppose this court each step of the way, because the treaty
establishing an international criminal court is not just bad, but I believe it is
also dangerous. The fact remains the most effective deterrent is the threat of
military action; and this court is undermining the ability of the United States
to do that very thing (Senator Helms, 1998: 2-3).
This statement indeed reflects the conflict of jurisdiction within an international
society composed of states with divergent political interests and agendas. It is this
ideology displayed by Helms that illustrates the means that the US (Bush

Administration) will soon take to undermine the ICC and protect what the US
believes its given right: sovereignty.
On December 31si, 2000 President Clinton, as a political gesture, signed the
Rome Statute. However, this proved to be a fa�ade as the former President claimed
the treaty was "significantly flawed", based on his ongoing concern over the court's
jurisdiction. Clinton de-legitimized his symbolic support further by recommending to
his successor that the Senate not ratify the treaty (CICC). His actions reflect the use of
symbolic political gestures, which are designed to appease a conflicting force that was
not ignorable: the US Delegate (Scheffer) and members of Congress (such as Senator
Helms and Senator Gramm) and members of international society (NGO's, CICC. and
allies that were in support of the court). President Clinton had originally intended on
supporting the Rome Statute with a vote in favor on July 1i\ 1998. However, the US
Delegate and Ambassador Scheffer failed to do as the Administration wanted. This is
revealed in the Congressional Hearings by Senator Gramm as he stated:
It is no secret that the United States walked away from this treaty negotiated
in Rome to establish an permanent United Nations international criminal
court. That was certainly
the right thing for you to do20 . I appreciate you having done that. I am aware
that the Administration was eager to sign that treaty, so the very fact that you,
Mr. Ambassador, declined to do so speaks volumes about how unwise this
treaty really is (Senator Gramm, 1998: 5).
The overwhelming non-support by the US Congress helps to explain Clinton's last
minute signatory to the Rome Statute with reservations. The presence of Senator
Ashcroft and his position further displays the ideology behind the current Bush

20

The Senator is addressing The US Ambassador.
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Administration as well as the issues of the contradiction of an international society.
Ashcroft states:
If there is one critical component of sovereignty, it is the authority to define
crimes and punishment. This court strikes at the heart of sovereignty by taking
this fundamental power away from individual countries and giving it to
international bureaucrats (Senator Ashcroft, 1998: 8).
The Bush Administration's determination to undermine the ICC is
demonstrated by the political and legislative maneuvering that has taken place during
their term in office. The actions of the Bush Administration reflect the dialectic nature
of international law (as a system that incorporates the broader political system). The
establishment of the ICC hindered the political interests of the Administration, thus
the US responded with a number of attempts to thwart the Court. In an effort to
restrict cooperation with the Court, on 28 November 2001, President Bush signed into
law H.R. 2500 (Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act) that contains amendment Section 630 which prohibits
the use of appropriated funds for cooperation with, assistance, or other support to the
International Criminal Court or its Preparatory Commission. The legislation of HR
2500 was a political move by the US to restrict the use of military finances that
supported any action for the ICC. In March 2002, Pierre Prosper, US Ambassador at
large for War Crimes, testified before the House International Relations Committee
calling for abolishment of war crime tribunals in the Hague and Arusha by 2008
(CICC Monitor, 9-2002). The Bush Administration then submitted a letter to the UN
on May 6th, 2002 that "formally declared US intention not to ratify the Rome Statute,

and renounced any legal obligations arising from its signature of _the treaty" (CICC,
Documents 2002).
The Bush administration attempted to exempt former US Ambassador to the
UN, Richard Holbrooke, from testifying before the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic. The Bush administration
was reported as being "wary of setting any precedent of senior US officials testifying
before international courts, particularly with regard to the International Criminal
Court" (CICC Monitor 9-2002).
On 2-August 2002, President George W. Bush signed the supplemental
appropriations bill, making the American Servicemembers' Protection Act binding US
national law. The American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASMPA) has been
dubbed the "Hague Invasion Act" (CICC 2002, Documents). The ASMPA restricts:
(1) US cooperation in any comportment with the ICC, (2) Participation in UN
Peacekeeping, and (3) giving military assistance to most countries that ratify the
Rome Statute. Section 2005 of the ASMPA restricting the US from UN Peacekeeping
missions is broken into several aspects providing the US "legitimate legislation" for a
coercive tool to de-legitimize the efficacy of the ICC. This includes (1) the UN
Security Council exempting US armed forces from international prosecution, (2) US
troops to only operate in non-party states of the ICC, or (3) a state wanting
participation in peacekeeping efforts must enter into the US Article 98(2), or (4) US
national interests supersede its opposition to the ICC. Section 2007 prohibits US
military assistance unless that state would enter into a bilateral agreement, Article
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98(2). The ASMPA had been in the works for nearly two years, as the US feared the
jurisdiction of the ICC. On June 14 2000 in the US Senate the discussion of
servicemen and issues of jurisdiction was opened. The opening statement made by
Chairman Helms displays the concern over jurisdiction with:
Now then, with the establishment of a prominent International Criminal Court
drawing nearer and nearer, the fact that American Servicemen and officials
may one day be seized, extradited and prosecuted for war crimes is growing.
And indeed, that day may have come (Chair, Senator Helms, 6/2000: 1).
The US did not stop at domestic maneuvering to suppress the efficacy of the
ICC. The Bush Administration put substantial pressure on the UN to ensure immunity
from the ICC's jurisdiction by threatening to end all relief aid to Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The timing of the US's demands for immunity were enhanced by the
costs of US aid withdrawal to the renewal of the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The result of the pressure put on the UN
and the international community resulted in a controversial UN resolution. On 12 July
2002, the Security Council voted on resolution 1422 granting peacekeepers from non
State Parties a one-year immunity from prosecution by the ICC. Resolution 1422 has
been viewed as an attempt by the US to undertake a multifaceted approach in its
efforts to prevent the functioning of the ICC as it was intended (US Ambassador John
Negroponte, 7-12-02). On June 1th 2003 Resolution 1422 was up for renewal at the
UN. The proposed Resolution 1487 would offer the US the same privileges of
impunity granted in 1422. Ambassador James Cunningham, Deputy United States
Representative presented the US position (USUN Press Release# 85 (03) June 12,
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2003). The US concern over sovereignty, jurisdiction, and laws of jus cogens and erga
omnes are evident in Cunningham's speech to the UN. He states:
The resolution is consistent with the fundamental principle of international
law, the need for a state to consent if it is to be bound, is respected by
exempting from ICC jurisdiction personnel and forces of states that are not
parties to the Rome Statute. It is worth noting that the resolution does not in
any way affect parties to the Court, nor the Rome Statute itself. Nor does it, as
some today suggested, elevate an entire category of people above the law. The
ICC is not "the law" ... It is important that Member States not add concern
about ICC jurisdiction to the difficulty of participating .... I would suggest
that even one instance of the ICC attempting to exercise jurisdiction over
those involved in a UN operation would have a seriously damaging impact on
future UN operations...The US has been and will continue to be a strong
supporter of the tribunals established under the aegis of this Council. But
unlike the ICC, those tribunals are accountable to the Security Council (USUN
Press Release# 85 (03) June 12, 2003).
The UN approved extending the US exemptions for another year in Resolution 1487.
Kofi Annan warned .that this should not become a yearly ritual for the US. Resolution
1422 and 1487 further weakens the jurisdictional powers of the ICC and ensures
further conflicts within the international society.
The US established bilateral agreement known as Article 98(2) is a response
by the US to Article 98 of the Rome Statute. The precautions taken by the Prepatory
Commission to recognize pre-dated international agreements resulted in a perceived
weakness within the text of the Rome Statute (Article 98). This resulted in the misuse
and misinterpretation that the US seized to pursue US interests and to further the de
legitimization of the ICC and limits the Court's already limited jurisdictional powers.
The US has drafted and circulated to over 100 countries a version of Article 98 (98,2)
that would literally render the ICC ineffective in attaining jurisdictional authority over
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US nationals, military, peacekeepers abroad as well as any national the US allowed
into its own territory.
The US Article 98 Agreements (98,2) begins with the US "Reaffirming the
importance of bringing to justice those who commit genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes". The Agreement continues with the affirmation by the US
of its intention to investigate and prosecute "appropriate acts". However, the US is
unable to prosecute persons covered by immunity agreements for all crimes that are
included in the Rome Statute and the second state is not obligated to prosecute in its
..

own court persons covered by this agreement. Crimes against humanity committed
abroad are not crimes under domestic Federal law. Federal courts have jurisdiction
over genocide committed abroad if committed by US nationals, but not US members
of the Armed Forces or persons not US nationals. Beyond the legalist jurisdiction that
formulates a contradiction in the US's statement of ability and willingness to
prosecute, the wording of 98 (2) states "where appropriate". Amnesty International
claims this is "indicating the decision to investigate and prosecute is a matter solely
within the discretion of the USA and not a matter of a law" (AI,8/2002). Additionally,
Article 98 (2) prevents US nationals and others from voluntarily serving as a witness
in cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (Al 8/2002). One of
the larger points of concern in the text of this Agreement is E (1) which defines
persons as former Government officials, employees (including contractors), military
personnel, and nationals of one party. This expands Article 98 (2) to include
individuals that would not fall under the agreement's purview. The US Agreement
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continues with E (a-b) by proclaiming no person present in the territory of the Party
be surrendered to the ICC, a third country, or expelled to a third country for purpose
of aiding the ICC in its proceedings. The Agreement has made provision that if one
party terminates the agreement, the agreement would still be valid for 1 year. The US
has clearly expanded the definition and attempted to enlarge the scope of persons
covered under Article 98 of the Rome Statute. The CICC states the delegates' choice
of terminology regarding "Sending State" was to ensure a consensus that this
terminology would limit the use of Article 98 to those states that sent someone to
another country under international agreement such as SOFA or an extradition treaty.
Interestingly, the Statute specifically addresses competing requests for the surrender
of a person in Article 90 (4) that states:
If the requesting State is a State not Party to this statute the requested State if
it is not under an international obligation to extradite the person to the
requesting State, shaU give priority to the request for surrender from the Court.
The Bilateral Agreements, Article 98 (2) are also based on the US fears of being held
accountable to the ICC even though the issues of Universal Jurisdiction were limited
by compromises. The US's political and military interests required impunity. The
solution sought out of fear was the impetus for returning back to inter-State relations
with bilateral agreements. The US fear of prosecution was reflected in the 2000
Senate Hearings:
The FBI has warned several former US officials not to travel to some
countries, including some in Europe, where there is a risk of extradition to
other nations interested in prosecuting them...Moreover, this year for the first
time we have seen an international criminal tribunal investigate allegations
that NATO committed war crimes during the Kosovo campaign. And a month
ago, in May, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson submitted to a
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degrading written interrogation by a woman named Carla Del Ponte, chief
prosecutor of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal (Helms, 6/2000: 2).
The results of the US attempts to overshadow international law and sidestep
legal obligations to treaties, charters, and statutes reflect the potential ineffectiveness
of the ICC due to its limited power, authority, and legal reach. These same
limitations are reflected in the withdrawal of Israel from the Statute and their
affiliation with the US on Article 98 (2). The international community's concern over
Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory was probably Israel's incentive to side with
US attempts to further weaken the powers of the ICC (CICC 2002). Indeed, the
political nature of international law coupled with the creation of new laws often
results in new international conflicts. Not only is the US pursuing immunity from the
ICC, but also it is assertively "persuading" other states to ignore the legitimacy and
jurisdiction of the ICC. The Bush administration has effectively circulated fifty-one
Bilateral Article 98 (2) Agreements. Of those, forty-eight States have signed
(including ten State Signatories of the ICC (s), twenty-two State Party Members of the
ICC (sp), and sixteen non State Parties (n)) (CICC, 2003). Currently the forty-eight
States that have signed these impunity agreements include: thirteen African States,
six Latin American States, thirteen Asian States, six Pacific States, six European
States, and four Middle Eastern States21 (CICC, 2003). The Bilateral Article 98 (2)
Agreements reflect the limited Jurisdiction of the ICC but it also reflects the larger
21

The list includes: (SP) Romania; East Timor; Tajikistan; Marshall Islands; Honduras; Gambia;
Djibouti; Nauru; Democratic Republic of Congo; Sierra Leone; Gabon; Ghana; Albania; Bosnia
Herzegovina; Bolivia; Uganda; Mongolia; Togo; Mauritius; Panama; Cambodia; Macedonia; (S) Israel;
Dominican Republic; Palau; Uzbekistan; Bahrain; Georgia; Madagascar; Philippines; Egypt;
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contradiction based on issues of sovereignty within the international society and the
contradiction of the system of international law. The contradictions have led to
conflicts that were addressed by establishing the ICC. However, the ICC was formed
through mass compromises without addressing the aforementioned structural
contradictions. The newly formed international system ofjustice and its
corresponding laws led to further conflicts which were attempted to be resolved (for
the US) with the creation of a Bilateral Agreement (Article 98 (2)). This in tum, has
led to further conflicts within the international society, as members disagree with the
US's actions. The creation of the ICC, a culmination of divergent political interests,
principles of historic laws, and· ideologies of the past confronted one another. The
question to be addressed regarding the compromises of jurisdiction, the US
withdrawal, and subsequent activities is how this all will affect the potentiality for the
ICC to be a proficient constraint or system of justice.

Seychelles; (N) Mauritania; Afghanistan; Micronesia; El Salvador; Sri Lanka; India; Nepal; Tuvalu;
Azerbaijan; Rwanda; Tonga; Maldives; Bhutan; Thailand; Nicaragua and; Tunisia.
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CHAPTER IV:
CONCLUSION

,.. by the
For a century, attempts to establish a permanent ICC were hindered
contradictions of international law and international society. The first proposals by the
International Law Association and the International Red Cross were vehemently
opposed as the inherent political nature of international law and society held to the
ideology that international law was founded on inter-State relations. The fundamental
issues of sovereignty coupled with political and economic interests were in direct
conflict witfi the proposals for a permanent internationally empowered criminal court.
As international laws (treaties, charters, and resolutions) were formed under the
ideology of an international society, conflicts continued to erupt: Franco-Prussian
War, WWI, and other intra/inter state conflicts. States occupying other states,
violating inter-State agreements, and competing economic interests failed to be
constrained. Further conflicts arose. These were addressed by enhancing international
law and by new proposals for an ICC. However, the political nature of international
law, the contradictions of an international society, and the contradictions of customary
law and existing codified laws limited the extent that an ICC would be considered.
Instead, ad hoc institutions were put in place. Again, the process of compromises and
laws made malleable for the purpose of being presented as a consensus of interests
failed to address the underlying contradictions of a growing international society and
international law.
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The atrocities and mass scope of WWII brought some ideological and substantive
changes to the relations of international society and for international law. However,
the concept of an ICC remained a distant hope as the primary contradictions of
international society being composed of sovereign territorial states and the need for a
universal international system of criminal justice remained. The ad hoc IMTs were
the substitute for the proposed ICC. The Nuremberg Principles did indeed lead to a
major ideological change for international law. However, this only reiterated the
contradiction between the concept of customary law asjus cogens and the need for
these Principles to be erga omnes. During the course of the "cold war", international
organizations contributed somewhat to the process of codification of international law
for the development of an ICC. However, the political nature of international law and
society within the historical context of a "cold war" and growing international
conflicts hindered the furtherance of establishing such a court.
By the 1990's the ideology of an "international community", international law as
universal, the end of the "cold war", and growing concern over global relations,
focused new attention on the concept of an ICC. However, as the preceding analysis
illustrated, the underlying contradictions of international law and international society
still impeded this process. Many divergent proposals and compromises led to the
Rome Statute. This did not resolve the conflicts or contradictions but instead fueled
the dialectic process. The result of attempts to resolve conflicts via new laws that
conflict with existing laws and traditions can lead to new conflicts such as the US
actions towards the ICC.
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Fueled by hope and pessimism, the potential of the ICC to fulfill its mission to
end impunity or to be seen as a legitimate body of justice remains. The hope lies in
the potential for the ICC to be malleable (Article 123) and to eventually fulfill the role
of a universal system of justice, free from the inherent political nature of international
law and international society. The pessimism lies in understanding
.· the fundamental
contradictions of an international society with independent states, divergent political,
economic, cultural, and religious diversity coupled with an ideology of one society
standing united under the rule of law based on universality. The need to resolve these
contradictions and conflicting concepts seems to be a necessary pre-condition for the
ICC to fulfill the mission many hope for.
The Potential of the ICC
The ICC does represent a major social change
• in international society. All
previous attempts to establish an ICC were met with enough political resistance to
result in ad hoc and non-empowered organizations. The Rome statute does provide
the first concrete manifestation of a universal system of justice to address the conflicts
of an international society. However, the conflicts (of yesteryear and today) are the
result of the much deeper contradiction of an international society composed of
sovereign states with deviating political interests, economic interests, cultural
variation, and religious foundations. Just as Chambliss's model illustrates, the
creation of laws (and in this case an entire legal system) to address conflicts are often
established, yet they fail to address the underlying contradictions of a system
(international system in this case). During the Rome Statute negotiations, the
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underlying contradiction of international society was addressed vis a vis debates over
a universal system with universal jurisdiction versus a Court that is complimentary
and with limited jurisdiction. Far from resulting in a Court of consensus, the ICC
remains a culmination of compromises. Yet, for the first time in over 100 years, the
Rome Statute does provide a permanent Court that may be utilized as both universal
and complimentary. Albeit, it still falls short of addressing or resolving the underlying
contradictions. The divergent political interests of states (economic interests, foreign
policy interests, issues of power, and military interests) coupled with deviating
cultural and-ideological positions of an international society22 still exist and could be
seen throughout the negotiations. The result is an ICC that is not completely
acceptable to either the LMGs or the opposition (mainly the US). This, along with the
limitations of the ICC suggests a dismal picture for the immediate or near future of
the Court as an effective constraint mechanism. However, the ICC does have the
potential to become an empowered universal Court.
The ICC has the potential to change interstate power relations. The "weaker"
states have for the first time a direct connection to the Court as a member for legal
settlements or charges against more powerful states. The potential to balance the
power differentials of the international society is a promising possibility for the Court.
The establishment of the ICC, regardless of its limited jurisdiction, presents another
22

States' cultural differences compose a small part of the larger contradiction of an international
society. Some states are hyper-capitalistic within their ethos (US) while other states' ethoses are more
cultural-capital based (China). The contradicting ideologies correspond with three main themes: the
ideological international society composed of united values, interests, and goals based on a agenda, the
current state of international relations based on consensual agreements with international law as a guide
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optimistic prospect: it can become a customary law to the echelon of erga omnes. A
treaty (Rome Statute) can become a part of customary law according to previous
precedence set by international law and the International Court of Justice. The
International Court of Justice states:
With respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary before a
conventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of
international law, it might be that, even without the passage of any
considerable amount of time, a very widespread and representative
participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that
of states whose interests were especially affected (ICJ: Continental Shelf Case,
1969)
Therefore, tne Rome Statute in the future may be conceived as general customary law
(such as the Nuremberg Principles) and reach a level of universal jurisdiction
regardless of the wording or limitations of jurisdiction. The phrasing of the Treaty can
then be altered under Article 123 of the Rome Statute. This article calls for the review
of the Statute and allows for changes deemed necessary by the international society.
Article 123 states:
1. Seven years after the entry into force of this Statute the Secretary
General of the United Nations shall convene a Review Conference to
consider any amendments to this statute. Such review may include, but
is not limited to, the list of crimes contained in article 5. The
conference shall be open to those participating in the Assembly of
States Parties and on the same conditions.
2. At any time thereafter, at the request of a State Party and for the
purpose set out in paragraph 1, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations shall upon approval by a majority of State Parties, convene a
Review Conference.
3. The provisions of article 121, paragraphs 3 to 7, shall apply to the
adoption and entry into force of any amendment to the Statute
considered at a review Conference. (Rome Statute, 1999: 59).
for inter-state relations only and, the division between civil legal systems as the frame for international
relations versus adversarial systems or complimentary systems versus universal systems.
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The potential for a treaty or practice to become customary law is also perceived as not
being limited to state practice but that opinio juris23 is sufficient for instant customary
law (Morris, 1999). This is founded on the principle that instant custom (customary
law) can be considered with virtual consensus of a Treaty. The potential of the ICC to
become universal would be the first of many steps necessary to resolve the
contradiction of international society. A universalistic system of justice would help to
remove the underlying contradiction of an international society composed of
sovereign states without legal permeable borders. It may also allow the emerging
ideology ofan international society (with new values of a united system) to be
articulated, accepted, and legitimized which could give further legitimacy to the ICC
and it's stated mission: an international system of justice to put an end to impunity
and the most atrocious crimes against humanity.
On the other hand, the potential of the ICC is hindered by the limitations of
jurisdiction based on issues of sovereignty. This was the case of the often-embittered
negotiations of the Rome Statute and is evident by the US withdrawal, opposition,
and flagrant actions aimed to impede the ICC. Due to the conflicts and the
contradiction of an international society the ICC has limited ability to exercise
jurisdiction. This can mean that many of the most heinous crimes will potentially not
fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. These include the crimes of the past (Article
11), those committed in the territory of a non-party state or by a national of a non
state party (Article 12), and certain war crimes (Article 8 and Article 124). The
Of the opinion that it is necessary law by the majority of states or customary state practice used by
the majority of states.
23
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Articles as they stand are indeed limiting for the ICC however, had the US attained all
of its positions the Court would only be empowered vis a vis the Security Council and
would be no more than previous courts: symbolic and a tool for the victors and
superpowers. Previous courts have had jurisdiction over state parties only. In general,
states have not relinquished jurisdiction to these courts concerning themselves and
were only utilized for the "others" or as ad hoc.
The "traditions" of individual states within an international system is manifest
in the historical trends of the US position for establishing an ICC. With each formal
proposal made for an ICC, the US has been opposed, claiming the dominance of state
sovereignty over an international system of justice that it would be subject to. The
proposal by France, after WWI, was met with reluctance and opposition by the US.
The US also failed to become a member of the League of Nations at this time. In
1945, after WWII, the US held a momentary position of support for a universal
system of justice (and jurisdiction). However, this support was limited to the German
perpetrators of genocide and war crimes and was quickly retracted when the proposed
court would pertain to the US. The US failed to support the establishment of an ICC
throughout the "cold war era" as it pursued its own self-interests, economic gains, and
strategic and military expenditures. Issues of sovereignty, universality of jurisdiction,
a system of complimentary, and pre-conditions of consensus have been the political
and ideological stand for the US's previous objections and lack of support in
establishing an ICC.
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Considering these structural weaknesses of the ICC the stated mission of
being "determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and
thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes" (Preamble Rome Statute) may be
more ideological than pragmatic. Beyond the pragmatics of the ICC, the theoretical
models suggest that as the underlying contradiction of an-International Society goes
unresolved, the temporal attempts to settle conflicts will continue through the
generation of expanding or creating new laws24. As the aforementioned Article 123
enables such change, it may well be the case that future conflicts will continue to be
resolved by-expanding the Rome Statute Articles at the expense of addressing the
underlying contradiction of international society.
Limitations
As with any research, this thesis has limitations that must be stated.
Qualitative methods are considerably more valid than some forms of quantitative
methods but lack reliability due to the inherent danger of subjective and speculative
interpretations that cannot be completely controlled for. Most researchers attempt
objective and value free interpretations; however, the effects of individual values and
views are still present in the researcher's interpretations. Therefore, it must be
understood that qualitative research does create the inherent danger of subjective
interpretation. By acknowledging the inherent values and views a researcher brings
with his/her interpretations, a safeguard has been established by proclaiming the
theoretical notions and frameworks to be utilized in the process of interpretation for
24

Examples of this include the two UN Resolutions granting immunity for US "peacekeepers" from the
Rome Statute jurisdiction and US Bilateral Agreements.
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this research (Vaughn, 1992). Other limitations of this study include the inability to
generalize. It is case specific and cannot be generalized to other socio-historical
studies. With any historical study, serious errors are possible when archival data is
utilized. However, the potential for errors of archival data can be controlled through
data triangulation. Archival information contains several i"nnate flaws (Berg, 1998).
Examples of this include missing elements in official documents or missing portions
of such documents. For this reason any research utilizing archival data is subj�ct to
receiving or attaining only partial information, This then limits what can be analyzed.
The other side to this limitation is the researcher's decision of what to analyze
structures what is sought after in archival collections.
The process of sedimentation of archived information also limits this study.
The sediment in archives is the result of people defining certain materials (and
excluding other material) as "worth keeping" in archival situations (Hill, 1993). This
includes primary sedimentation in which individuals or organization create, save,
collect, or discard material. The deposit of archived information is then reliant on
what becomes "deemed" as relevant information. This puts archival data at risk for
incomplete or subjective access (Hill, 1993). This has been a problem with this study
as many of the archived documents are no longer available due to being transferred to
basements (Ann Arbor Library, University of Michigan) and have been damaged or
lost. Other documents have been lost in the process of being transferred to microfesh
and unable to be found.
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Other limitations include the compartmentalization of social agencies and
international organizations that contribute to the complex nature of assessing the
intent, impact, and social context of the political decisions that created, administered,
proposed, and/or ended the attempts to embody an ICC. Specifically, the multitudes
of actors, agencies, and interdepartmental organizations, can contribute to an
overwhelming and complex context that will leave some areas of analysis inaccessible
or incomplete. The temporal nature of political representatives and active social
agents will also be reflected in any analysis attempting to provide a heuristic case
study. Finalfy, the recorded documentation within international documents will
seldom reflect the political and conflicting activity thatoccurs "behind the political
curtain", shrouding the political deliberations that may have influenced the policy
makers decision (Bassiouni, 1997). Specific commentaries and committee meetings
dialogues were unattainable for this research. Documents attained for this research
were limited to published formal documents by the United Nations and the League of
Nations that lack the dialogue of members and specific details of debates surrounding
key issues of this research (jurisdiction, compromise processes, and arguments of
sovereign. Therefore, a "true" and complete history of the journey to an ICC cannot
be written at this time.
Future Research
Due to the scope of this project, many unanswered questions and details
remain for future research. Each historical contingency (attempt to establish an ICC)
could be expanded on to create an exhaustive analysis for that specific historical
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context. With the availability of time and funds, this thesis could be expanded to
include interviews of participants in the Rome statute negotiations. In-depth searches
for hidden agendas, memos and unpublished documentation of the conflicts that
occurred during the negotiation process could provide more insights into the political
ideologies and interests that influenced negotiations for the ICC.
New research opportunities will be available when the ICC begins to take
cases. Research could also focus on the organizational structures of the bureaucratic

..

system of the ICC. This could include research on the issues of prosecutorial
discretion, the role of the Security Council, and or international support for the ICC.
Another need for future research includes the concept of customary law regarding
if/or when the ICC attains the level of jus cogens, expanding the jurisdictional
territory of the ICC without a new treaty. These suggestions are but a few areas that
future research on the ICC may take. However, as the ICC is a new international
body, proposing a very different ideology to international society and for international
law, the potential for future research is far-reaching.
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APPENDIX:

International Society
Contradictfons

Ideology

Consensus
Shared Values
Shared Goals
Common Interests

Existing Re.lations

Independent Sovereign States
Self Governing

Conflicts
Addressed by proposing court
Based on ideology of international society
Universal Jurisdiction

Conflicts

Jurisdiction

/

�

Issues of Sovereignty
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